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I. INTRODUCTION
Doing It to Death, a 1973 album featuring a rousing vocal
performance by James Brown, begins with a solemn proclamation
that the listener is about to experience the eighth acknowledged
wonder of the world.' Despite his battles with addiction and a few
unpleasant encounters with the law, Brown tried hard to deliver on
this promise in a lifetime of music and showmanship. Nevertheless,
on Christmas Day 2006, Brown departed this world,2 reducing its
number of acknowledged wonders once more to seven. In the
ensuing months, evidence emerged that the "Godfather of Soul" was
also a natural father to many individuals, including some who saw
his death as an opportunity to enrich themselves from Brown's
estate.3 Not surprisingly, litigation followed.4
In his will, executed on August 1, 2000, Brown specified that his
personal and household effects were to be distributed in accordance
with any written memoranda he left at his death, and if no such
memoranda existed, they were to be divided among his children.5
Through a pour-over clause,6 he devised the residue of his property
to the trustees under an irrevocable trust agreement executed prior
to the will.7 Although the will did not set forth the terms of the trust
THE J.B.'s, Introduction to the J.B.'s, on DOING IT TO DEATH (People Records 1973). The
announcer does not mention Brown in his introduction, referring instead to his backing band,
the J.B.'s, to whom the album was credited. Id. Indeed, except for the title track and the
pragmatic anthem You Can Have Watergate: Just Gimme Some Bucks and I'll Be Straight, the
songs on the album are mostly instrumental. Id. It was Brown, however, whom the Rock and
Roll Hall of Fame honored in 1986 among its first group of inductees. Rock and Roll Hall of
Fame and Museum, http://www.rockhall.com/inductee/j ames-brown (last visited Sept. 3,2009).
2 Jon Pareles, James Brown, the 'Godfather of Soul,'Dies at 73, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,2006,
at Al.
' See Brenda Goodman, Godfather of Soul; Father Many Times Over, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2007, at A14 (noting about a dozen requests for DNA tests, three of which returned
positive).
4 See David Segal, Soul Survivors: James Brown's Children, In Court, WASH. POST,
Aug. 11, 2008, at C01 (noting that fight over Brown's estate "now encompasses 10 lawsuits, 30
lawyers and enough theatrical hostility and cheap shots for a night of professional wrestling").
' Last Will and Testament of James Brown, at Item I, App. to Brown AfT., In re Estate
of Brown, No. 2007-ES-02-0056 (S.C. Prob. Ct. Aiken County Jan. 18, 2007).
6 For information on pour-over dispositions by will, see generally UNIF. TESTAMENTARY
ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS ACT § 1 (1991), codified at UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-511 (2008); and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 19 (2003).
' Id. at Item II.
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agreement,8 news reports soon indicated that Brown had in fact
created two trusts.9 One of the trusts was to provide for the
education of James Brown's grandchildren who were under age
thirty-five.' ° The bulk of Brown's property, however, reportedly
went to the so-called "I Feel Good Trust," created to help educate
underprivileged children in South Carolina and Georgia."
Court filings and newspaper articles indicated that Brown gave
his home, as well as the rights to his music, image, and likeness, to
the I Feel Good Trust. 2 A few weeks after Brown's death, however,
his children and grandchildren claimed that the trustees were
engaging in improper conduct and mismanaging the trust property.13
Five of Brown's children later argued that the devise was void on the
ground of undue influence. 4 A woman claiming to be Brown's
spouse also claimed a share." By the first anniversary of Brown's
death, there were as many as twenty-seven lawyers arguing over his
estate on behalf of various parties." As the litigation proceeded,
s Id. at Item 11 (naming trustees, while giving no other terms of trust).
9 See Children Contest James Brown Will, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2007, at E2 [hereinafter
Children Contest] (discussing Brown's trusts). As a rule, the terms of inter vivos trusts are not
publicly recorded, which makes them popular among celebrities and others desiring secrecy.
See JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WiLis, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 440-41 (8th ed. 2009) (noting that inter vivos trusts are kept private); Frances H.
Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 555, 559-60 (2008) (discussing privacy advantage
of revocable trusts).
10 See Children Contest, supra note 9 (discussing terms of Brown trusts); see also Segal,
supra note 4 (stating that all of Brown's grandchildren were included in family trust).
" See Segal, supra note 4 (discussing rights devised to and purposes of I Feel Good
Trust). The trust shared the name of one of Brown's biggest hit songs, I Got You (I Feel
Good), which reached number three on the Billboard Hot 100. See Artist Biography: James
Brown, httpJ/www.billboard.com/artist/james-brownl4186#/artist/james-brown/bio/4186 (last
* visited Sept. 3, 2009).
"2 See, e.g., Brown v. ACMI Pop Div., No. 1-06-0870, slip op. at 8 (Ill. Ct. App. Aug. 2,2007),
http./www.state.il.us/court/OPINIONS/AppellateCourt/20O7/lstDistrict/August/060870.pdf
(discussing devises to I Feel Good Trust); Children Contest, supra note 9, at E2 (same); Sandi
Martin, Further Disputes Are on the Way: Children's Attorney Plans More Filings over Singer's
Trusts, AUGUSTA CHRON., May 7, 2007; Segal, supra note 4 (same).
" See Emergency Petition for Appointment ofSpecial Administrator para. 19, In re Estate
of Brown, No. 2007-CP-02-0122 (S.C. C.P. Aiken County Feb. 5, 2007) (noting that trustees
mismanaged trust "to the detriment of the beneficiaries").
14 See Children Contest, supra note 9 (reporting that children sought to invalidate will on
ground of undue influence).
'5 See Segal, supra note 4 (noting that Brown's putative widow sought half of estate).
16 See Bo Emerson, James Brown's Estate Still in Dispute a Year After His Death, KAN.
CITY STAR, Dec. 26, 2007, at A7 (quoting Brown's former personal representative).
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however, it emerged that Brown's estate was in fact of very little
value, due to an estimated debt of $1.6 million. 7 Brown's executors
soon auctioned off hundreds of Brown's personal effects at Christie's,
realizing just over $800,000 from the sale.'8
James Brown is not the only deceased celebrity whose legacy or
assets have attracted recent media attention. Not long after the
September 2008 death of legendary actor Paul Newman, an image
surfaced of his will, in which he devised his publicity and intellectual
property rights to his personal charity, Newman's Own
Foundation. 9 In April 2009, Marlon Brando's trustees brought a
lawsuit claiming that Brando's name was being wrongfully used in
connection with an apartment complex in Southern California."
Michael Jackson, who died in June 2009, left behind a complicated
estate whose long-term commercial potential has been compared to
that of Elvis Presley.21 Moreover, although she died nearly a half-
century ago, Marilyn Monroe continues to make headlines, as when
a film of her on the set of her last completed movie, The Misfits, sold
for $60,000 at a 2008 auction of cinema memorabilia.22 Thanks to
her publicity rights, Monroe's estate produces millions of dollars in
annual revenue, earning her a place on the Forbes list of top-earning
dead celebrities.23 When a court decision threatened to invalidate
those publicity rights,' the California legislature intervened by
17 See Segal, supra note 4 (characterizing Brown's estate as "[b]eyond broke").
18 See id. (discussing sale of Brown's personal property).
19 See Paul Newman, Philanthropist, Does Hereby Leave..., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008,
http'J/cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ (Type "Paul Newman" into "search this blog"; click search)
(discussing terms of Newman's will). On the charitable purposes of Newman's Own
Foundation, see Newman's Own Foundation, http-//www.newmansownfoundation.org (last
visited Sept. 3, 2009).
20 See Michael Cieply, Protecting Brando Legacy, Trustees You Can't Refuse, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2009, at C1 (discussing alleged abuse of Brando's name).
21 See Tim Arango & Ben Sisario, Despite a Will, Jackson Left a Tangled Estate, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2009, at A14 (noting talk of turning "Neverland" into Graceland-like museum).
' See Steven McElroy, 'The Misfits'on Block, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,2008, at E2 (discussing
auction of film of Monroe on the set of The Misfits).
23 See Matthew Belloni, Marilyn, Money Fueling Right of Publicity Battle, REUTERS,
Sept. 14,2007, http'//www.reuters.com/articleentertainmentNews/idUSN1424817820070914
(noting that Monroe's estate reportedly earned $8 million through publicity rights in 2006);
Peter Hoy, Top-Earning Dead Celebrities: It's Still a Bull Market in the Bone Yard,
FORBES.COM, http/www.forbes.com/2008/10/27/top-dead-celebrity-biz-media-deadcelebs08-cz
_ph.1027celebslide_10.html (discussing Monroe's estate).
2 See Belloni, supra note 23 (discussing lawsuits in New York and California involving
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enacting a statute to protect the rights for the residuary beneficiary
of her will.25 A new dispute then arose regarding whether Monroe
died domiciled in California, which now recognizes her publicity
rights by statute, or in New York, which continues to deny the
existence of postmortem rights of publicity.26
The original issue presented in the litigation over Monroe's estate
was whether Monroe could have disposed of her publicity rights by
will, given that such rights were not recognized as devisable at the
time of her death." When Monroe died in 1962, publicity rights
were not seen as a form of property that could be transmitted by will
or intestacy. 28 During the following years, courts continued to
debate the legal status of survivable publicity rights.29 More
recently, however, courts and legislatures have begun to recognize
a celebrity's right of publicity as a property interest that may survive
his or her death. 0 Some states allow celebrities to give their
publicity rights to named individuals by will, so that they do not
pass by intestacy."' This comports with the basic U.S. principle of
Monroe's postmortem publicity rights, both resulting in court decisions against a holding
company formed by the widow of Monroe's residuary beneficiary).
25 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b), (h), (p) (West Supp. 2009); Belloni, supra note 23
(discussing bill's retroactivity).
21 See Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 3939(CM), 2008
WL 4127830, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008) (discussing New York's nonrecognition of
postmortem publicity rights).
27 See Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1152,
1155-56 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (discussing court's initial decision and subsequent abrogation by
§ 3344.1).
2 See Miller v. Comm'r, 299 F.2d 706, 707-11 (2d Cir. 1962) (rejecting Petitioner's
contention that a capitalizable property interest in Glenn Miller's publicity rights survived his
death).
29 See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958-60 (6th
Cir. 1980) (concluding that interests weighed in favor of not recognizing postmortem publicity
rights); Lugosi v. Univ'l Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979) (reversing lower court's ruling
that name and likeness are property that may survive an artist's death).
'o See David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDoZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 83-84 (2005) (noting that vast majority of states recognize survivable
publicity rights).
31 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344.1(b) (West Supp. 2009) (providing that publicity rights
'shall vest in the persons entitled to these property rights under the testamentary instrument
of the deceased personality effective as of the date of his or her death," and "[uin the absence
of an express transfer," to the residuary beneficiary). Florida provides that the publicity rights
of a deceased person vest in "any person, firm or corporation authorized in writing to license
the commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or if no person, firm or corporation is so
authorized, then by any one from among a class composed of her or his surviving spouse and
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freedom of testation, which gives the testator an unlimited power to
disinherit children in favor of other persons.32
Therefore, states that recognize postmortem publicity rights may
allow celebrities to leave those rights to whomever they please, as
long as the celebrities have competent volition and the devises do not
violate public policy.3 Yet, like other valuable property interests,
publicity rights are subject to federal transfer taxation.34 When a
decedent dies holding an interest in property, that property will
generally be included in the decedent's gross estate for purposes of
the federal estate tax.35 If the celebrity devises his or her publicity
surviving children." FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1)(c) (2009).
32 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 9.6
cmt. i, 10.1 cmt. c (2003) (discussing general deference to donative intent). For an historical
discussion of the principle of freedom of testation in U.S. law, see generally Adam J. Hirsch,
Inheritance: United States Law, in 3 OxFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL
HISTORY 235,235-40 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009) ("Mhe United States stands out as a country
peculiarly deferential to the wishes of the dead."). Louisiana, which offers some children
limited protection from disinheritance, is an exception. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 5; LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 1493 (2000); see also Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The
Regrettable "Revolution" Completed, 57 LA. L. REV. 55, 146 (1996) (discussing Louisiana's
changes to forced-heirship system). Spouses, unlike children, are protected in nearly all states
by community-property law or elective-share statutes. Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn't
I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to Whomever I Choose at My Death? (Or How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Start Loving the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 739 (2006). Only Georgia
has neither community-property law nor an elective-share statute. See Verner F. Chaffin, A
Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: The Surviving Spouse, Year's Support and
Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REV. 447, 463-70 (1975) (debating need for statutory protection
for spouses in Georgia). Elective-share statutes, however, may be evaded to some extent by
inter vivos transfers. See 1 JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL
ESTATE PLANNING, § 10.18, at 10-50 (2008 ed.) (examining variance among states in treatment
and recognition of elective share); LAWRENCE, W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 10-24 to -25 (4th ed. 2006)
(suggesting that U.S. Treasury bills may be mechanism for evasion); Jeffrey N. Pennell,
Minimizing the Surviving Spouse's Elective Share, in THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL PHILIP E.
HECKERLING INST. ON ESTATE PLANNING I 904.3(C), at 9-35 (Tina Hestrom Portuondo
ed., 1998) (discussing option of changing one's domicile).
" On the requirement of competent volition, see Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth
of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236-37, 245-46 (1996); and Ray D.
Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 589-92 (1997). On the public
policy limitations imposed on testamentary freedom, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir,
More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L.
REv. 634,644-47 (2008); and Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist
Theory of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1273, 1301-06 (1999).
' See 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (2006) (including "all property" as part of taxable estate).
"' See id. (defining value of gross estate).
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rights to a charity or a charitable trust, as Brown and Newman seem
to have done, the rights will escape taxation because of the
charitable deduction.3" On the other hand, if the celebrity devises
the rights to his or her spouse, the tax will be postponed until the
spouse's death by virtue of the marital deduction.3" If no deduction
applies, however, the publicity rights will be part of the taxable
estate, and the tax may be due at the celebrity's death.3"
Because publicity rights are included in the gross estate at death,
some executors of celebrity estates may be compelled to sell the
rights in order to pay the tax, even when doing so conflicts with the
wishes of the testator or the family. With this conceivable difficulty
in mind, two law professors, Mitchell Gans and Bridget Crawford,
have collaborated with estate planner Jonathan Blattmachr to
imagine a hypothetical revolution in the treatment of postmortem
publicity rights. In successive essays published in the Yale Law
Journal Pocket Part, Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr suggest that
a state like California could solve the alleged "estate tax problem"
associated with postmortem publicity rights by enacting a statute
that would vest those rights automatically in specified statutory
heirs regardless of the terms of the decedent's will.39 Under this
"relatively simple legislative solution," unless the celebrity destroys
the right of publicity inter vivos, the right would pass to the
surviving spouse or children or, in the absence of such heirs, to other
collateral relatives.4" This, the authors contend, would result in the
exclusion of the publicity rights from the celebrity's gross estate, and
therefore the avoidance of estate tax.4'
36 See id. § 2055 (discussing charitable deductions).
'7 See id. § 2056 (governing deductions for surviving spouse's interest).
See id. § 2011 (describing calculation of estate tax).
'9 Mitchell M. Gans, Bridget J. Crawford & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Postmortem Rights
of Publicity: The Federal Estate Tax Consequences of New State-Law Property Rights, 117
YALE L.J. POCKETPART 203,207 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/2008/04/01/ganscrawfordblatt
machr.html [hereinafter Gans et al., Postmortem Rights]; see also Mitchell M. Gans, Bridget
J. Crawford & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, The Estate Tax Fundamentals of Celebrity and
Control, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 50,50 (2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/content/view/709/
14/ [hereinafter Gans et al., Fundamentals] (responding to my critique of their original
proposal).
"' See Gans et al., Postmortem Rights, supra note 39, at 207-08 (discussing "solution" to
federal estate tax problem).




In my own Pocket Part essay, I replied to Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr, concluding that their "legislative solution" will not in
fact remove publicity rights from the gross estate.42 A testamentary
disposition, I noted, is "no less taxable when it is compelled by
statute."43 Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr have in turn defended
their original proposal, drawing analogies to cases involving
employment contracts and wrongful death statutes."
In this Article, I respond to the latest arguments of Gans,
Crawford, and Blattmachr, explaining why the abolition of
testamentary freedom in a particular state would not, by itself,
facilitate the avoidance of federal tax. It is unlikely that simply
eliminating the power of testation would dissuade the federal
government from collecting revenue to which it is entitled under the
Internal Revenue Code (the Code), and Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr have not yet addressed the consequences that might
follow if a state takes more drastic measures. My primary goal in
this Article, however, is to take the debate to another level by
considering the broader questions at stake. First, should celebrities
such as James Brown and Paul Newman-assuming their publicity
rights do not die with them-be permitted to give their rights to a
charitable trust or foundation, or should the rights pass to certain
statutorily specified relatives of those celebrities? Second, if
survivable publicity rights were to vest automatically in statutory
heirs, how might that impact the distribution of wealth over time,
and how would that fit with the policy justifications for transfer
taxation?
The first of these questions may, at first glance, seem easy to
answer. Given our legal system's preference for freedom of
testation,45 why would we want to treat publicity rights differently
from other property interests? The problem is more complicated
than it might appear. Publicity rights are a relatively new legal
42 Joshua C. Tate, Marilyn Monroe's Legacy: Taxation of Postmortem Publicity Rights, 118
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 38 (2008), http'//yalelawjournal.orgcontentview/700/141.
Id. at 41 (citing I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-51-001 (Aug. 8, 1986)).
See Gans et al., Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 51-52 (drawing parallels to Kramer
v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. C1. 1969) and Conn. Bank & Trust v. United States, 465
F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1972)).
" See supra note 32.
2009]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
creation, but they are deeply connected with the holder's personal
reputation. Accordingly, they have something in common with two
other kinds of rights with a much longer history: (1) the right to
control the postmortem disposition of one's body46 and (2) the right
to profit from one's artistic creations.4" In these two limited
contexts, the Anglo-American legal tradition has historically
tolerated some restrictions on testamentary freedom.4' A case could
be made that publicity rights merit special treatment as well.49
My own view regarding these two other contexts is that the
reasons for restricting a testator's control of his corpse do not apply
to publicity rights, and that there is no good policy reason for
limiting the power to devise a copyright. I will further argue that
even if there were a valid argument for creating a statutory forced
share in publicity rights, such a measure would not justify an
exclusion from the federal estate tax. Scholars and policymakers
have justified federal transfer taxation on the grounds that it
supports the progressive nature of the overall tax system,50 acts as
a "backstop" to the income tax,5 prevents excessive accumulation of
dynastic wealth,52  promotes equality of opportunity,53  and
compensates the state for its role as a "silent partner" in the
accumulation of wealth.54 Above all of these goals is that of raising
4 See infra Part III.A.
47 See infra Part III.B.
48 See infra notes 192-93, 212-14 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
50 See Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 273
(1983) ("[Alny tax system which relies solely on an income tax to attain progressivity will not
sufficiently tax the underlying wealth that generated the income.").
51 See Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1183, 1191 (1983) ("The transfer tax serves as a 'backstop' to the income tax by taxing
the wealth that taxpayers accumulate through tax-preferred income sources.").
52 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-144, at 124 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 226
("Historically, one of the principal reasons for estate and gift taxes was to break up large
concentrations of wealth."); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 825, 825-28 (2001) (exploring possible role of estate tax in decreasing concentration of
wealth in United States).
"3 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 469,470 (2007) ("Equality of opportunity is understood to be one of the bedrock principles
supporting the taxation of inheritance."); Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89
MICH. L. REV. 69, 73 (1990) (arguing that curtailing inheritance through federal transfer taxes
would have effect of "increasing equality of opportunity while raising revenue").
5 See, e.g., JEFFREY N. PENNELL, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 11 (4th ed. 2003)
("The wealth transfer tax is the most convenient way-it comes at a relatively easy time-to
[Vol. 44:1
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revenue for the federal government, which was a significant impetus
for the creation of federal transfer taxes.55 By contrast, ensuring the
specific financial security of individuals who happen to be related to
deceased celebrities is not a defensible policy goal.56
Before proceeding, I should clarify the limited scope of this
Article. I do not attempt to resolve the broad question of whether
publicity rights should survive the death of the celebrity; that issue
has already been the subject of much scholarly debate." Nor do I
advance any new argument in favor of the general wisdom of
testamentary freedom, a task I have already attempted in an earlier
piece.5 ' This Article has two narrow goals. First, I intend to show
that there is no compelling reason to deviate from the default rule
of testamentary freedom in the specific context of postmortem
publicity rights. Second, I wish to demonstrate that neither current
law nor any known policy considerations would justify treating
publicity rights differently for federal tax purposes due to
restrictions on the power of testation.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part II discusses the
history of publicity rights and the arguments for and against
allowing them to be asserted after a celebrity's death. A primary
purpose of recognizing publicity rights during a celebrity's lifetime
is to give the celebrity the power to safeguard his or her public image
from misuse by others.59 By allowing publicity rights to survive the
death of the celebrity, the law makes it possible for a third party to
protect the celebrity's reputation after death. As a consequence,
however, the law permits the transfer of significant wealth to
pay back the contributions that the government, the economy, and society made to the
decedent's accumulation of wealth.").
" See Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223,
225-26, 230 (1956) (explaining that foreign policy crises and Civil War motivated the first and
second attempts at federal death taxes, respectively, and onset of World War I drove revenue
need that led to 1916 estate tax).
"6 In fact, many consider just the opposite to be true. See sources cited infra
notes 298-300.
51 See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
'8 See Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 129, 129 (2008) (defending broad freedom of testation in context of rewarding
caregivers).
5' See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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individuals who already have many advantages in our society.6"
Commentators have offered various justifications for this, including
theories of unjust enrichment6' and the notion that postmortem
transmission of publicity rights encourages lifetime creativity and
effort." Regardless of the merits of these theories, courts and
legislatures have generally held that publicity rights should survive
a celebrity's death.63
Part III considers whether, in light of the policy bases for
recognizing postmortem publicity rights, the law should recognize
freedom of testation with regard to those rights as well.
Testamentary freedom has been relatively restricted in two other
contexts having to do with one's person: the law pertaining to the
disposition of one's body after death and the law of copyright. 4
While publicity rights are similarly connected with one's personhood,
they are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate consideration
under the law.
First, publicity rights are not subject to the thick overlay of state
regulation that, for good or ill, governs the disposition of the body
after death. Moreover, the decisions that heirs and devisees must
make regarding the exploitation of valuable publicity rights may be
far more complicated than the choice of where to bury the deceased
and are less closely associated with the immediate grief that follows
a family member's death.65 Second, unlike copyrights, publicity
rights are not created by federal statute and should not be subjected
to rules that are of doubtful merit even in the copyright context.66
The connection between publicity rights and personhood does not
60 This does not mean that a transfer ofsignificant wealth will necessarily occur whenever
a celebrity dies, but only that the law permits such a transfer to occur. Cf infra note 312 and
accompanying text (explaining why publicity rights may be worthless in many cases).
61 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
' See Westfall & Landau, supra note 30, at 83-84 (noting that most states now recognize
postmortem right to publicity).
6 See infra Part III.A-B.
' See Frances H. Foster, Individualized Justice in Disputes over Dead Bodies, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1351, 1374-98 (2008) for a discussion of problems raised by strictly deferring to the
decedent's testamentary intent with regard to the postmortem disposition of the body.
' For criticism of the limits on testamentary freedom imposed by copyright law, see Lee-




justify depriving a celebrity of the right to choose who will best
protect his or her image over the long term.
Part IV addresses tax law and policy. I will begin by addressing
the technical legal arguments of Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr,
who rely on authorities that, in my view, offer insufficient support
for their conclusion. Section 2033 of the Code includes property in
the decedent's gross estate "to the extent of the interest therein of
the decedent at the time of his death."67 Employee death benefits,
the centerpiece of the latest arguments of Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr," admittedly may fall outside the scope of § 2033 in
some circumstances.69 This, however, is not a consequence of any
statutory constraint on the power of testation, but rather relates to
the fact that the decedent never had an ownership interest, while
living, in the assets from which the survivor's benefit may be paid.7 °
By contrast, when a decedent owns certain assets in fee simple at
death, state statutory limitations on testamentary freedom do not
remove those assets from the gross estate under § 2033.71 Gans,
Crawford, and Blattmachr concede that descendible publicity rights,
as presently constituted, are "property owned by the decedent at
death.., that likely will be included in a decedent's gross estate."72
To make publicity rights comparable to excluded employee death
benefits, a state would have to impose substantial limitations on the
inter vivos transferability of those rights, with potential
consequences that Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr have not yet
67 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (2006).
' See Gans et al., Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 51-52 (discussing § 2033's
applicability to employee death benefits).
69 See Estate of Royce v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 1090, 1093 (1942) (restricting § 2033 to
probate assets); Edward A. Zelinsky, Transfer Taxation Without Transfer: Reflections on
Employer-Provided Death Benefits, Section 2039, Disclaimers, New Forms of Wealth, and the
Evolution of the Federal Estate Tax, 58 TUL. L. REV. 974, 983-84 (1984) (discussing Higgs'
Estate v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 280 (1949), rev'd, 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950), in which the Internal
Revenue Service attempted to tax a widow's portion of a joint survivor annuity, but failed to
argue under § 2033).
70 See Estate ofDiMarco v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 653,663-64 (1986) (concluding that employee
had no property interest in death benefits when those "benefits were payable out of the general
assets of [the employer], not out of any fund in which decedent had a vested interest, and the
benefits did not accrue until decedent's death").
71 See Estate of Frost v. Comm'r, No. 17333-89, 1993 WL 75053, at *14 (T.C.
Mar. 18, 1993) (holding that property subject to surviving spouse's elective share under state
law is nonetheless "plainly subject to Federal estate tax" under I.R.C. § 2033).
7 Gans et al., Postmortem Rights, supra note 39, at 206 & nn.16-17.
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explored. Without such lifetime restrictions, only an amendment of
the Code could remove postmortem publicity rights from the gross
estate.
I will then move on to the more fundamental question of whether
publicity rights should be given a special tax status as a matter of
policy. Although current law does not support exempting publicity
rights from taxation on the basis of a forced-heirship scheme, the
Code could be changed to produce this result." I will argue,
however, that such a change would lack a coherent policy
justification, because it would favor the children of celebrities in a
tax scheme that arguably should aim to promote equality of
opportunity.7 4  Moreover, if forced heirship were generally
recognized as a basis for tax avoidance, the abolition of freedom of
testation could preempt the entire system of federal transfer
taxation.
I will conclude Part IV by noting that publicity rights do pose
valuation difficulties under tax law independent of any forced-
heirship statute.75 In many cases, perhaps most, the rights may
actually be worthless. Rare is the celebrity whose fame is truly
immortal and whose death will trigger a substantial estate tax
liability at death. To guard against overvaluation, Congress could
shift the statutory burden to the Internal Revenue Service (the
Service) to establish that a celebrity's publicity rights are indeed
worth enough to justify the imposition of tax. This would not
prevent the Service from collecting tax at the death of a timeless
icon, like Marilyn Monroe, to the extent that it could prove the value
of her publicity rights at the time of her death. It would, however,
offer more protection for the estates of celebrities whose fame dies
along with them. On the other hand, if the Code were amended so
as to undervalue postmortem publicity rights, such an amendment
might lessen the tax incentive for giving the rights to charity.
Congress would likely wish to promote charitable gifts like those
73 See infra Part IV.B.
"' See infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
71 On one difficulty, see Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood: Estate Taxes and the
Compelled Commodification of Identity, 17 VA. TAX REV. 759, 780-82 (1998). Madoff focuses
on the potential that the estate tax may force certain families to exploit postmortem publicity
rights in a way contrary to the preference of the deceased celebrity.
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made by Brown and Newman.76 Part V will offer some brief
concluding thoughts.
II. THE PATH TO POSTMORTEM PUBLICITY RIGHTS
The right of publicity, defined as the right to control the
commercial use of one's identity by others, traces its origins back to
the general concept of a right of privacy." Publicity rights were not
made alienable until the 1950s,7" and it took many years for courts
to accept the notion that publicity rights could survive the death of
a celebrity. 9 Because the right of publicity permits an individual to
restrict another person's speech, any expansion of the right in the
United States may collide with the constitutional limitations of the
First Amendment. ° Nevertheless, in the last few decades of the
twentieth century, American celebrities and their heirs and devisees
successfully persuaded courts and legislatures to extend the right of
publicity beyond the holder's death." This Part will discuss the
history of the right of publicity and how it came to be accepted as a
legitimate property interest. There is no single compelling rationale
for recognizing a right of publicity, but scholars have made several
policy arguments that are relevant to the issue of testamentary
freedom.
76 For pertinent policy discussions, see, for example, Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable
Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAx L. REV. 263, 273-320 (2007) (finding a strong
normative case for a charitable deduction but a weaker case that it should be unlimited); and
Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1721, 1734-43 (2006) (arguing that the tax system should generally encourage the
donation of intellectual property to charitable organizations).
17 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 1:3-:4 (2d
ed. 2008) (chronicling the development of the right of publicity, beginning with the
establishment of the right to privacy).
78 See Westfall & Landau, supra note 30, at 76-79 (discussing Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953)).
71 See id. at 83-89 (discussing debates among courts and commentators leading to
recognition of survivable publicity rights).
s See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment
and the Right of Publicity, 51 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 21), available at
httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=1410372 (noting that analysis is "particularly complex" when
publicity-right claim "involves potential damage to human dignity"); Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. REV. 903, 908-13 (2003) (discussing core
constitutional dilemma).81 See infra notes 101, 105 and accompanying text.
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A. PUBLICITY RIGHTS: A SHORT HISTORY
Publicity rights in the United States are grounded in the right of
privacy," which in turn traces its origins to an 1890 article by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.' Perturbed by the publication
of newspaper gossip about private persons, Warren and Brandeis
argued that a right to privacy is inherent in the law's protection
against unauthorized publication of manuscripts and artistic
creations, and that this right was not grounded in the concept of
property in its ordinary sense.' 4 According to Warren and Brandeis,
however, the right came with limitations.85 It did not, for example,
protect against the "publication of matter which is of public or
general interest," as when "a man's life has ceased to be private." 6
Although the concept of a right of privacy was not immediately
embraced by the courts, it gradually gained approval, until, by 1960,
few U.S. jurisdictions rejected the concept and a broad majority
embraced it.87 Warren and Brandeis's original conclusion, that those
bothered by "idle or prurient curiosity" should have a legal cause of
action,' has had a greater impact on legal theory than on actual
U.S. practice. 9 By discovering an inherent right of privacy in the
82 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
8 See id. at 196-205 (noting that because part of the value of the right is the "peace of
mind or the relief afforded to prevent any publication" of the claimant's work, "it is difficult
to regard the right as one of property"). On the circumstances that led to the writing of the
Warren and Brandeis article, which may have involved newspaper reports of a party given by
the Warrens, see, for example, Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell
to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 295-96 (1983). The article
may also be seen, however, as an attempt to introduce into U.S. law a broader concept of
privacy protection from Continental Europe. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western
Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1204-06 (2004) ("[IUt is best
to think of the Warren and Brandeis tort not as a great American innovation, but as an
unsuccessful continental transplant.").
's See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 83, at 214 (excluding matters of public interest).
8 Id. at 214-15.
87 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 384-88 (1960) (chronicling the
gradual acceptance of the right of privacy by state courts beginning with New York).
" Warren & Brandeis, supra note 83, at 220.
89 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 221 (2007) ("The twentieth-century
story... is in part a story of the decline and fall of one form of protection of privacy and
secrecy for the rich and the powerful."); see also Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First
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law, however, Warren and Brandeis laid the essential foundation for
the development of the right of publicity.
The term "right of publicity" was first used in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., a Second Circuit case
from 1953 involving a dispute between two manufacturers of
chewing gum.9 ° In the case, a baseball player had entered into a
contract with the plaintiff that granted the plaintiff an exclusive
right to use the player's image in connection with the plaintiff's
chewing gum. Despite an exclusivity provision that limited the right
solely to the plaintiff, the player subsequently entered into a similar
contract with another chewing gum manufacturer, the defendant.9'
The issue was whether the baseball player had a right to the use of
his photograph that was assignable to the plaintiff on an exclusive
basis.92
In resolving the case, the court turned to sections 50 and 51 of the
New York Civil Rights Law,93 which, under the rubric of a right of
privacy, prevented the unauthorized use of a living person's image
for commercial purposes.94 The New York legislature enacted these
provisions in 1903 in response to a Court of Appeals decision
denying the existence of an actionable right of privacy of the sort
envisioned in the Warren and Brandeis article.95 Prior to the Haelan
decision, however, it was unclear whether the right delineated in the
New York statute could be assigned to others. Presented with this
question, the Haelan court held that an assignable "right of
publicity" existed "in addition to and independent of' the statutory
right of privacy.96 The court declined to decide whether the right of
publicity could be considered a " 'property' " right, calling the
Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1097, 1101 (1999) (stating that the
tort of publication of private facts "often seems to exist more 'in the books' than in practice").




94 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney Supp. 2008) (making unauthorized use
of image a misdemeanor and authorizing private right of action for retrospective and
prospective relief).
9' See Robersonv. Rochester FoldingBox Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443,447-48 (N.Y. 1902) ("[T]he
so-called 'right of privacy' has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence. . .
Prosser, supra note 87, at 385 (discussing Roberson opinion).
' Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
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question "immaterial" notwithstanding the obvious pecuniary value
of the player's image. s7
Law review commentators soon began to address the question left
unanswered by the Haelan court. Melville Nimmer insisted in 1954
that the right of publicity "must be recognized as a property (not a
personal) right."8 In 1960, Harold Gordon reinforced this view,
arguing that the status of the right as a property interest
determined the severity of the injury.99 By contrast, William Prosser
echoed the sentiment of the Haelan opinion, calling it "pointless to
dispute over whether such a right is to be classified as 'property'";
nevertheless, he agreed that the right had a "proprietary nature."'00
In 1962, the Second Circuit was forced to address the issue of
whether publicity rights were property. In Miller v. Commissioner,
an income tax dispute arising nearly two decades after the death of
renowned bandleader Glenn Miller, the court was asked to
determine whether the right to create and distribute a film based on
Miller's life was a capital asset under the Code, which in turn
depended on its status as "property" as a matter of state law. 1 1
Acknowledging that the Haelan decision had recognized a right of
publicity, the Miller court nonetheless noted that the Haelan court
had carefully avoided defining such a right as a property interest
and the Miller court declined to take this extra step.10 2 At least after
Miller's death, the court held, the right to make use of his image was
not property.''
Over the two decades following the Miller decision, the weight of
opinion gradually shifted in favor of recognizing publicity rights as
97 id.
98 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,216 (1954).
9 See Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
Nw. U. L. REV. 553, 607 (1960) ("[In the light of the state of the law in this field, the tag
'property' becomes material as furnishing a firm basis for distinguishing between claims which
have a solid pecuniary worth and those involving injured feelings.").
100 Prosser, supra note 87, at 406.
101 299 F.2d 706, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1962). Miller died in 1944, but his popularity continued
long afterward. See id. at 707 (noting that a motion picture on Miller's life yielded over four
hundred thousand dollars for his widow ten years after his death).
'02 Id. at 707-11.
103 See id. at 711 ("We do not believe that for income tax computation purposes the
beneficiaries of the estate of a deceased entertainer receive by descent a capitalizable'property'




property. In 1977, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, drafted under
Prosser's supervision as Chief Reporter, stated clearly that the
appropriation of a person's name or likeness "is in the nature of a
property right." 10 4  With the question of whether the right was
property answered, the debate turned to whether the right
terminated upon the celebrity's death. A few early opinions inferred
from the designation of publicity rights as property interests that the
rights must survive the death of the holder."5 Other courts,
however, declined to draw this conclusion, reasoning that
considerations of policy, especially the public's interest in the free
flow of information, counseled against the recognition of postmortem
publicity rights. °6
Law review commentators soon took up the issue. A few argued
in favor of survivability on grounds of public policy,' 7 while others
concluded that survivability followed from the conclusion that
'04 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977); see also Westfall & Landau,
supra note 30, at 81 (discussing Prosser's influence in writing section 652C).
.05 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The
identification of this exclusive right [of publicity] as a transferable property right compels the
conclusion that the right survives [the celebrity's] death."), vacated as moot, Pirone v.
MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585-86 (2d Cir. 1990); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("There appears to be no logical reason to terminate [the
publicity] right upon death of the person protected. It is for this reason, presumably, that this
publicity right has been deemed a 'property right.' "), abrogation recognized by Jim Henson
Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175,190 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); State
ex rel. Elvis Presley Intl Memorial, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97-98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) ("If a
celebrity's right of publicity is treated as an intangible property right in life, it is no less a
property right at death.").
"o See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960 (6th Cir. 1980) ("It
seems fairer and more efficient for the commercial, aesthetic, and political use of the name,
memory and image of the famous to be open to all rather than to be monopolized by a few. An
equal distribution of the opportunity to use the name of the dead seems preferable."); Lugosi
v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425,431 (Cal. 1979) ("If rights to the exploitation of artistic or
intellectual property never exercised during the lifetime of their creators were to survive their
death, neither society's interest in the free dissemination of ideas nor the artist's rights to the
fruits of his own labor would be served."), superseded by statute, CAL. CIrV. CODE § 3344.1
(West 2008), as recognized in Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1024 (C.D.
Cal. 1998).
107 See, e.g., Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of
Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1132 (1980) ("The
inheritance of publicity rights serves to support a major social policy already recognized in the
copyright laws."); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of
Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 191, 228 (1983) ("[A] freely descendible right of publicity for
all individuals is the only approach which truly vindicates the primary interests protected by
the right of publicity.").
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
publicity rights were property.10 8 Some contended that policy
considerations actually weighed against making the right
survivable.0 9 Courts and legislatures, however, generally opted in
favor of survivability. Currently, nineteen states recognize a
postmortem right of publicity, either by statute or by judicial
decision, while only two states, New York and Wisconsin, continue
to deny survivability. 10 Nevertheless, the issue is not entirely
settled, as the recent litigation over Marilyn Monroe's estate has
shown."' Continued resistance to survivable publicity rights in New
York stems from the fact that the right to privacy is recognized in
the state only by virtue of a statute, and the existence of an
independent common-law right of publicity is denied."2 Even if a
postmortem right of publicity is recognized, there are compelling
reasons to impose a temporal limitation on the right so that it does
not become a perpetuity; yet any temporal limitation is likely to be
108 See, e.g., Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM
L. REV. 453, 497 (1981) ("The right of publicity should be survivable generally in the hands of
heirs, beneficiaries, and assignees because of its essentially proprietary nature. .. ."); Ben C.
Adams, Recent Development, Inheritability of the Right of Publicity Upon the Death of the
Famous, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1980) ("ITihe right of publicity should be inheritable for
a designated period of time and that inheritability should not depend upon previous
exploitation of the right."); Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and
Celebrities, 42 BROOK. L. REV. 527, 545 (1976) ("[Once the publicity right is accurately
depicted as a property right, the conclusion that it passes on death flows as a matter of
course.").
'09 See, e.g., Steven J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 111,137 (1980) ("Mhe arguments against recognition of a post-mortem right of publicity
appear compelling.... To the extent that the right of publicity conflicts with the right of free
expression, such conflict would be prolonged by post-mortem recognition of the right.").
110 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 77, §§ 9.18-.40. Survivability has been repudiated by a state
court in New York, and a federal court has held that publicity rights do not survive death
in Wisconsin. See Hagen v. Dahmer, No. 94-C-0485, 1995 WL 822644, at *4 (E.D. Wis.
Oct. 13, 1995) (concluding that Wisconsin's common-law right of publicity is only recognized
for living people); James v. Delilah Films, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding
no cause of action on behalf of successors-in-interest of right of publicity). A recent effort to
overturn the New York case law and provide for survivability by statute has stalled in the
state legislature. See S.B. S6005, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007), available at http'J/
public.leginfo.state.ny.us (click"Locate by Document Number" and search Bill number"S6005"
in year "2007"); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 77, § 9.31 (discussing New York's legislative
proposal).
1' See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
112 See Antonetty v. Cuomo, 502 N.Y.S.2d 902, 905-06 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (noting absence of
common-law cause of action for violation of right of privacy). This is a consequence of the
Roberson decision, discussed supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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an arbitrary limitation.' Despite the tide of opinion in favor of
survivability, the ultimate derivation of publicity rights from the
right of privacy continues to be a source of dispute." 4
B. THE CASE FOR PUBLICITY RIGHTS
Since the concept first emerged in the 1950s, scholars and jurists
have offered many different justifications for recognizing a right of
publicity. Some are concerned merely with the existence of the right
during a celebrity's lifetime, while others aim to defend a
postmortem right as well. Although the numerous justifications that
have been offered defy simple categorization, one useful distinction
might be between arguments that are primarily economic,
evaluating the impact on society as a whole, and those that take a
more moral and individualistic approach. Both types of arguments
have some bearing on the survivability of publicity rights, but
neither has escaped scholarly criticism.
1. The Economic Case. A common economic argument made in
defense of publicity rights generally, and postmortem publicity
rights in particular, is that they provide an incentive for a celebrity
to work hard and engage in creative endeavors that benefit
society."' This claim is related to the standard justification for
granting patents to inventors and allowing authors to retain
copyrights in their works. 1 6 As applied to postmortem publicity
113 See Hoffman, supra note 109, at 138 ("If the right of publicity is to descend yet not
extend to perpetuity, a durational limit must be set. Yet any term of years chosen would be
arbitrary...."). The California statute sets a time limit of seventy years from the death of the
deceased celebrity, and provides that no action may be brought regarding use of the celebrity's
name, likeness, or image occurring after this period. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(g) (West
Supp. 2008).
114 Cf Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property:
A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, 64 (1985)
(attributing the inadequacy of reform proposals to the fact "that the right of publicity cannot
be separated easily from its roots in the right of privacy, as some have apparently thought").
115 See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982) ("Recognition of the right of publicity rewards and thereby
encourages effort and creativity."); Felcher & Rubin, supra note 107, at 1128 ("The social policy
underlying the right of publicity is encouragement of individual enterprise and creativity by
allowing people to profit from their own efforts.").
"' See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.. . ."); Zacchini v.
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rights, moreover, it is a branch of a general argument that has long
been made in defense of freedom of testation. 117 At least in the
publicity rights context, however, the incentive argument lacks
supporting empirical evidence."'
Given that millions of consumers are willing to pay substantial
sums to hear and see well-known musicians and actors, those
entertainers who are successful can expect generous compensation
regardless of whether a legal right of publicity exists." 9
Merchandising and advertising, the two main contexts in which a
publicity right matters, are ancillary activities for many celebrities,
whose main income stream comes from performance. 2 ° The lack of
a right to publicity in the early twentieth century does not seem to
have deterred young Americans from seeking careers in show
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (reasoning that protection of right of
publicity "provides an economic incentive for [the performer] to make the investment required
to produce a performance of interest to the public" and that "[tihis same consideration
underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by this Court").
117 See, e.g., 1 FRANCIS HUTCHESON,ASYsTEMOF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, INTHREE BOOKS 352
(1755) (arguing that "industry shall be much discouraged" if the right of testation were
eliminated); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 53 (4thed. 1919) ("Mhe abrogation
of the power of bequest would remove from [the individual] an important inducement to the
exercise of industry and thrift in advancing years.... ."). The argument dates to at least the
medieval period, appearing in the thirteenth-century English treatise known as Bracton as a
defense of testamentary freedom. See 2 BRACTON ONTHE LAwSAND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 181
(George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne ed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (c. 1235)
(NIA] citizen could scarcely be found who would undertake a great enterprise in his lifetime if,
at his death, he was compelled against his will to leave his estate to ignorant and extravagant
children and undeserving wives.").
118 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 207 (1993) (arguing that there is no evidence in support of
incentive argument). This objection is not necessarily limited to the publicity rights context.
See Adam J. Hirsch & William KS. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND.
L.J. 1, 8 (1992) (noting that individuals may strive to accumulate wealth beyond needs of
lifetime consumption for variety of reasons unrelated to power of testation); see also A.C.
PiGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 718-19 (4th ed. 1932) (suggesting that transfer taxes
'should impose a relatively small check upon the creation of capital" because individuals have
other reasons to accumulate wealth besides desire to direct its disposition after death).
Indeed, some wealthy individuals go to great pains to avoid publicity. See, e.g., In re Estate
of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 822-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (reviewing petition to seal probate
records of wealthy decedent in order to protect family members from kidnapping).
119 See Madow, supra note 118, at 209-11 ("Abolition of the right of publicity would leave
entirely unimpaired a celebrity's ability to earn a living.. ").
120 See Westfall & Landau, supra note 30, at 88 ("[Aldvertising and merchandising is
usually an incidental and not a primary activity for the celebrity....").
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business."' Furthermore, even if the prospect of inter vivos publicity
rights encouraged celebrities (or would-be celebrities) to work
harder, it does not follow that making those rights devisable or
descendible would have substantially increased that incentive.'22
One suspects that if publicity rights were held to terminate at
death-or even abolished entirely-Hollywood studios would
nonetheless be able to hire competent actors for next year's summer
blockbusters, and major-league sports teams would encounter little
difficulty drafting new players.
Another economic argument in favor of publicity rights has to do
with the so-called "tragedy of the commons," i.e., the notion that a
resource that can be exploited by everyone without regulation will
eventually be reduced to nothing. 2 ' According to this argument,
because private property rights internalize the externalities that
result from overuse, they can reduce or eliminate this problem.'24 In
the advertising context, this means that celebrity images will not be
overused, but rather will be licensed to those advertisers who value
them the most.'25 If granting a property right in a celebrity's image
protects its pecuniary value to commercial licensees, making the
right survivable further increases the value, as the licensees need
not fear losing their interests at the celebrity's death.'26
121 See, e.g., 42ND STREET (Warner Bros. Pictures 1933) (depicting allure of Broadway
employment in depths of Great Depression).
'22 See Hoffman, supra note 109, at 136 ("[It is hard to see how making the right of
publicity inheritable could result in an increase in creative endeavors over that which would
result if the right were limited to living celebrities.").
1'2 See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The
Fishery, 62 J. POL. EcoN. 124, 135 (1954) ("Wealth that is free for all is valued by none because
he who is foolhardy enough to wait for its proper time of use will only find that it has been
taken by another."). The term "tragedy of the commons" comes from an article by Garrett
Hardin, although he did not invent the concept. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy
of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
124 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967) ("[Plroperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization
become larger than the cost of internalization.").
121 See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978) ("There is
a perfectly good economic reason for assigning the property right in a photograph ... this
assignment assures that the advertiser to whom the photograph is most valuable will purchase
it.").
1 See Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296
S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982) ("Ifthe right of publicity dies with the celebrity, the economic value
of the right of publicity would be diminished .... ."); Westfall & Landau, supra note 30, at 88
(noting that licensees would prefer rights with fixed duration rather than "arbitrary cut-off
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Like the economic incentive argument, the tragedy of the
commons argument for recognizing publicity rights has its flaws. It
is not clear, for example, whether overexploitation of a celebrity's
image actually reduces the value of the image to society as a whole,
as opposed to the value to the celebrity. As Michael Madow has
argued, "A Madonna T-shirt may be worth more, not less, to
consumers precisely because millions of her fans are already wearing
them."2 v Unlike land, fish, and other scarce resources, the supply
of celebrity images is limited only by the public's willingness to
accept particular individuals as being worthy of fame. 2 Some forms
of property are better owned and managed by society as a whole
rather than by individuals.'29
Consumer protection provides another rationale for publicity
rights, stemming from the tragedy of the commons argument.
Celebrity endorsements arguably provide useful information to
consumers because consumers could view a celebrity's willingness to
risk his or her reputation by endorsing a product as a signal of the
product's quality. 30 A principal difficulty with this argument, apart
from the lack of supporting empirical evidence, is that rights of
publicity allow celebrities to prevent not only misleading or
fraudulent uses of their images, but also relatively benign uses.131
Thus, publicity rights overprotect against the danger that consumers
will be deceived. Moreover, any reliance on celebrity endorsements
by consumers may be a consequence of the current legal recognition
date" at celebrity's death).
12 Madow, supra note 118, at 222 (emphasis in original).
128 See id. at 224 (noting that celebrity is a "social creation" and a renewable resource).
1 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 720 (1986) (describing a category of "inherently public"
property that is "collectively 'owned' and 'managed' by society at large").
130 See James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal
Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 645 (1973) ("Even in areas outside the celebrity's specialty the
notion of sponsorship may contribute to a consumer's reactions to his endorsement."); Douglas
G. Baird, Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1186 n.7 (1978) (analogizing right of publicity to
trademark).
131 See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833, 837 (6th
Cir. 1983) (denying right to market portable toilets using entertainer's catchphrase on ground
of entertainer's right of publicity); Madow, supra note 118, at 230-35 (arguing that consumers
are adequately protected by federal and state law regarding deceptive trade practices, and any
additional safeguard provided by the right of publicity is "redundant").
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given to publicity rights.'32 If consumer protection were the sole
concern with regard to celebrity endorsements, the law could allow
unlimited use of a celebrity's image but require a disclaimer if the
celebrity had not personally consented to the use.'33 In any case, the
consumer protection argument does not effectively justify
postmortem publicity rights, because a deceased celebrity cannot
vouch for the quality of a new product, or for the continuing quality
of a product endorsed during the celebrity's lifetime.
2. The Moral Case. In addition to economic arguments, certain
philosophical arguments are made in favor of recognizing publicity
rights. First among these arguments is the so-called labor theory of
property as articulated by the seventeenth-century philosopher John
Locke. In Locke's view, because "every Man has a Property in his
own Person," it follows that "[tihe Labour of his Body, and the Work
of his Hands ... are properly his."'34 Commentators and judges have
used similar reasoning in defending a celebrity's right of publicity,
alleging it to be a product of the celebrity's labor or an outgrowth of
the celebrity's personhood. 35 A corollary argument is that anyone
who makes use of a celebrity's image without his or her permission
is thereby unjustly enriched. 3 ' Thus, there is a moral case in favor
132 See Madow, supra note 118, at 235 (noting that reduced legal protection of publicity
rights would likely change consumer reaction to celebrity advertising).
133 Alternatively, the law could allow celebrities to designate certain products with an
"official" endorsement, and permit only a producer that had received this seal of approval from
marketing its product as the "official version." Id. at 236.
13 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (emphasis in original).
135 See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) ("A
celebrity must be considered to have invested his years of practice and competition in a public
personality which eventually may reach marketable status. That identity, embodied in his
name, likeness, statistics and other personal characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is
a type of property."); MCCARTHY, supra note 77, § 2:1 ("Perhaps nothing is so strongly intuited
as the notion that my identity is mine-it is my property to control as I see fit." (emphasis in
original)); Sims, supra note 108, at 459 ("Like the goodwill of a business or a self-employed
professional, the value of the celebrity's right of publicity lies in his creation of a positive or
otherwise intriguing image in the public mind. .. ").
136 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 581 (1977) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that unjust enrichment is reason for recognizing publicity rights);
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215,221 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that postmortem
publicity rights must be upheld in order to avoid giving "windfall" to nonlicensees), vacated as
moot, Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585-86 (2d Cir. 1990).
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of recognizing publicity rights, independent of whatever incentive
effect might result from recognizing them.
Publicity rights, however, may differ from other property created
through labor, to the extent that they derive their value from a
combination of luck, media attention, and public acclaim, not from
the celebrity's own efforts.'37 The recent story of Vickie Lynn
Marshall illustrates this point. Vickie, a former waitress and exotic
dancer, catapulted to fame as Anna Nicole Smith after being selected
as the 1993 "Playmate of the Year" in Playboy magazine and
attracting the attention of J. Howard Marshall, one of the wealthiest
men in America. 3 ' Howard, who met the young and attractive
Vickie in a Houston strip club, married her despite being more than
sixty years her senior. 139 During her marriage, and after Howard's
death in 1995, Vickie (as Anna) acted in several movies, hosted her
own television show on the E! network, and served as a
spokeswoman for TrimSpa, a diet supplement, before dying an early
death in 2007.140
The story of Anna Nicole Smith is not easily reconciled with
Locke's labor theory of property.' 4 ' Although Anna may have worked
hard to become a celebrity, a tremendous amount of good
fortune-being the right person at the right place at the right
time-clearly played a significant role. Had Anna never met
137 See Madow, supra note 118, at 188-96 (discussing fame as socially-created construct
that depends on factors other than merit).
13 Abby Goodnough & Margalit Fox, Anna Nicole Smith Is Found Dead at a Florida Hotel,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at A12.
139 In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 18-23 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
140 See Goodnough & Fox, supra note 138 (chronicling Smith's later career).
1' Another contemporary example might be Samuel "Joe the Plumber" Wurzelbacher,
whose chance encounter with Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential campaign and
subsequent centrality to the final presidential debate made him a national icon among
conservatives, leading to a book deal and eventually an assignment as a war correspondent
in Israel. See Timothy Egan, Typing Without a Clue, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 2008 (discussing
Wurzelbacher's quick rise to fame); Shelly Paz, Joe the Plumber Is Here, and He Ain't Happy,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 12, 2009 (reporting on Wurzelbacher's visit to Israel); Larry Rohter,
Plumber from Ohio Is Thrust into Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at A27 (chronicling
Wurzelbacher's various appearances on national television).
142 On the relative insignificance of individual merit in the achievement of fame, see
generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 17-20 (2008) (noting that
successful people "are invariably the beneficiaries of hidden advantages and extraordinary
opportunities and cultural legacies that allow them to learn and work hard and make sense
of the world in ways others cannot").
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Howard, and had Playboy not selected her for a pictorial, she might
have spent the rest of her life working at a strip club. One may
doubt whether either of these momentous events had much to do
with Anna's own personal work ethic. It is difficult, therefore, to
disentangle Anna's natural right to the profit made from her image
from that of Playboy magazine, or Howard's estate, or society at
large. It is even more difficult to view Anna's heirs or devisees as
having some natural claim to that profit, to the extent that any
profit can be made from Anna's image in the future.'43
In short, the labor theory of property provides a weak justification
for publicity rights, because a celebrity's image is not necessarily a
product of the celebrity's own labor. This does not mean, however,
that publicity rights lack moral justification. In a recent article,
Mark McKenna raises a different moral argument, which he terms
"autonomous self-definition."' According to McKenna, "because an
individual bears uniquely any costs attendant to the meaning of her
identity, she has an important interest in controlling uses of her
identity that affect her ability to author that meaning."'45 McKenna
uses an example of an elderly couple who were unwittingly filmed
walking through a park, and discovered the footage was being used
in a television commercial for erectile dysfunction medication. The
husband became angry, not because his image was being shown on
television, but because of the implication that he suffered from
impotence.'46 McKenna concludes that each individual, celebrity or
otherwise, should be able to prevent the public use of his or her
image in a manner that conflicts with the individual's self-
definition. 4 v
... Although the right of publicity is a creature of state law, federal law recognizes a "right
of attribution and integrity" for the author of a work of visual art. Unlike state publicity
rights, however, this federal right is expressly limited to the life of the author. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(d) (2006) (-IT]he rights conferred by subsection (a) [regarding attribution and integrity]
shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the author.").
14 Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT.
L. REV. 225, 231 (2005).
145 Id. at 279.
146 Id. at 280.
147 See id. at 294 ("Because the things with which individuals choose to associate reflect
the way they wish to be perceived, unauthorized use of one's identity in connection with
products or services threatens to define that individual to the world.").
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McKenna's moral argument may be the strongest case to date for
recognizing a right of publicity. By grounding the right in
reputational concerns, McKenna has reestablished the right's
pedigree as a descendant of the right of privacy. Reputational
concerns, however, were not the driving force behind the movement
to make the right of publicity survivable, which took its cue
primarily from the definition of the right as a property interest.""8
If reputational protection is the sole persuasive rationale for
publicity rights, it is not self-evident that they should be survivable,
or even transferable. 14'9 Nevertheless, the recent intervention of the
California legislature in favor of the Monroe estate suggests that
postmortem publicity rights are not likely to disappear in the near
future.10
Some have defended freedom of testation as a general principle
on the grounds that humans are naturally or socially predisposed to
give effect to the last wishes of deceased persons."' As Adam Smith
148 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
149 For a recent critique of the postmortem extension of publicity rights, see Michael
Decker, Note, Goodbye, Norma Jean: Marilyn Monroe and the Right of Publicity's
Transformation at Death, 27 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 256-71 (2009). For a discussion
of how extending publicity rights to noncelebrities on reputational grounds implicates special
First Amendment concerns, see Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants to Be a Star:
Extensive Publicity Rights for Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1605, 1611-12 (2001). Overall, American law has traditionally frowned upon the
monopolization of intangible property, except when some compelling policy rationale exists,
as in the case of patents and copyrights. See Madow, supra note 118, at 200-05 ("The general
American rule . . . has long been that absent some special and compelling need for
protection ... intangible products ... are as 'free as the air to common use.' (emphasis in
original)). Institutional pressures in the American legal system, however, can lead to a lack
of consistency in the application of such principles. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE
L.J. 1, 68 (2000) (suggesting that "compact and well-organized private interests" may have
pressured local courts in Tennessee to recognize right of publicity); J. Eugene Salomon, Jr.,
Note, The Right ofPublicity Run Riot: The Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179,
1179-91 (1987) (criticizing development of divergent state and federal regulatory regimes
regarding publicity rights); cf. Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57
N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 291, 295-98 (2000) (discussing general problem of inconsistency in
appellate adjudication).
16o See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
's' See, e.g., LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 21 (1955) ("A compelling
argument in favor of [testation] is that it accords with human wishes.'); see also Sherman,
supra note 33, at 1298 ('[Pleople want the right to bequeath, and... as a matter of... self-
protection on the part of the governors-the law should give people what they want unless
powerful principles or constraints countervail.").
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once explained, we "naturally find a pleasure in remembering the
last words of a friend and in executing his last injunctions," because
of our so-called piety for the dead.'52 If this is true, it might provide
a justification for survivable publicity rights that does not depend on
their status as a property interest.153 Giving effect to the last wishes
of the dead, however, means recognizing freedom of testation, and
American law has historically imposed some limits on that freedom
with regard to rights intimately connected with personhood.'54 The
next Part will explore the reasons for this and ask whether publicity
rights should be treated in a similar way.
III. PERSONAL RIGHTS AND FAMILY PROTECTION
Freedom of testation is the fundamental principle underlying
inheritance law in the United States. 55 There are some limitations
on this freedom, especially with regard to a testator's spouse, who
may be protected by an elective-share statute or community-property
law. 156 In general, however, each individual has a broad right to
leave property to persons of his or her choosing, even if this means
disinheriting the individual's own descendants.5 v Nevertheless,
when it comes to certain rights closely intertwined with the person
of the testator, American law has ironically tended to give more
weight to the wishes of the testator's family, even when they conflict
with the testator's stated intention.
152 ADAM SmITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 466 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (1766).
This may be related to a concept of intergenerational equity found in some traditional legal
cultures, which see "no valid temporal distinction between the dead, the living, and the yet to
be born." H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN
LAW 75-76 (2d ed. 2004).
15 On the psychological implications of self-expression through bequests, which can serve
a utilitarian function, see Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 199-200
(1989); and Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 33, 52-56 (1999).
' See supra notes 65--66 and accompanying text.
155 See Hirsch, supra note 32, at 239 (noting that testamentary freedom is broader in
America than anywhere in Western world).
15 See sources cited supra note 32.
'5' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a (2003) ("The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom
of disposition."); cf Tate, supra note 58, at 134 (arguing that U.S. rule is justified in order to
allow elderly persons to reward their caregivers).
2009]
30 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1
In an influential article, Margaret Radin argues that some types
of property, such as "a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a
house," should be treated differently under the law in some
circumstances because they are intrinsically bound with
personhood. 58 Moreover, some potential assets, such as the cells in
one's body, are so intimately connected with one's personhood that
courts may not consider them "property" at all.'59 Because
commercial transactions with respect to those assets violate general
moral sensibilities, the law may follow a paternalistic approach and
adopt a rule of inalienability, at least during the lifetime of the
person concerned. 6 ° This paternalism may not apply to gratuitous
transfers at death.'6 ' The question, then, is whether moral or other
concerns should lead courts or legislatures to restrict testamentary
transfers of rights that are a reflection of the owner's personhood.
This Part will discuss two contexts where this has historically been
the case: (1) state law pertaining to the control of one's body at
death and (2) federal copyright law. The historical interference with
1" Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-61, 1014-15
(1982). Building on Radin's theory in the context of estate taxation, Ray Madoff has criticized
what she terms the "myth of fungibility," or the false notion that all property interests can be
assigned an objective value independent of their personal connection with the owner. See
Madoff, supra note 75, at 795-800 ("Although the estate tax system treats all property as
fungible, people do not think of or treat all of their property as fungible."). For recent
commentary on Radin's theory of property as personhood, see, for example, Kristen A.
Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 313, 341-46 (2008); and
Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MiCli.
L. REV. 1093, 1109-15 (2009).
159 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 491-92 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that patient has no property interest in cells excised from his body). But see Hecht
v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that decedent's sperm is
property that may be part of his estate). Another example is a person's name, which is
generally not considered a property interest, although French law treated it as such prior to
the late nineteenth century and the modem law is more complicated than one might assume.
Audrey Guinchard, Is the Name Property? Comparing the English and the French Evolution, 1
J. Civ. L. STUD. 21, 22-25 (2008).
" See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (1972) (discussing
inalienability and moralism with respect to selling oneself "into slavery," taking "undue risks
of becoming penniless," and selling "a kidney").
"I' See, e.g., REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 4-5, 7, 11 (amended 2006), 8
U.L.A. 61-62, 65, 72, 84-85 (Supp. 2009) (allowing, but not requiring, individuals to donate
all or part of their bodies for specific purposes or to specific individuals or institutions). But
see ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 167-95 (1991) (discussing compulsory postmortem
transplants of human organs).
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testamentary freedom in these contexts does not offer much, if any,
support for a forced share for publicity rights.
A. DISPOSITION OF THE BODY
The United States inherited its legal tradition from England, a
country that, unlike our republic, has long had an officially
sanctioned church.'62 From an early date, the presence of an
established church shaped the development of English law relating
to the disposition of a deceased person's body.'63 Sir Edward Coke
summed up the common law's position in the seventeenth century
by explaining that "[t]he buriall of the Cadaver... is nullius in bonis
[no one's property], and belongs to Ecclesiasticall cognizance,"
although a common-law action would lie for the destruction of a
funeral monument." While the disposition of a corpse was
generally a straightforward matter in pre-industrial England,
disputes could and did arise concerning the place and manner of
burial. 6 ' Such disputes were governed by canon law and could be
heard by an ecclesiastical court, even though church officials
generally treated these disputes as administrative matters. 66
When burial issues arose in English law prior to the late
nineteenth century, Parliament and the courts generally favored the
interests of the church and the needs of the community as a whole
over the preferences of individuals. 67 Unless some ecclesiastical
prohibition applied, every person who died in England had the right
to Christian burial.'68  Special requests, however, would not
162 See 1 R.H. HELMHOLZ, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND: THE CANON LAW AND
ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION FROM 597 TO THE 1640s, at 1-64 (2004) (describing development
of English church law).
'63 See id. at 392 (discussing how churches oversaw burial wishes).
14 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 203
(London, M. Flesher 1644).
' See cases cited infra notes 169-72.
166 See 1 HELMHOLZ, supra note 162, at 495. This did not mean that canon law was silent
on the subject of burial. See, e.g., X 3.28.3 (holding that a parishioner's choice of burial site
would be invalid if it was a less sacred site, which parishioner selected out of malice); X 3.28.7
(ruling that a married woman could freely choose a burial site).
167 See sources cited supra note 165.
168 The Queen v. Stewart, (1840) 113 Eng. Rep. 1007, 1009 (KB.).
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necessarily be followed. For example, if a parishioner wished to be
buried within the church itself, as opposed to the churchyard, his
petition would be left to the discretion of the relevant church
official. 6 ' The same rule applied if a parishioner wished to be buried
in a particular part of the churchyard. 70 If a parishioner wished to
be buried in another parish, he generally could not do so without the
permission of the churchwardens of that parish. 7' Church officials
also had the right to approve or disapprove monuments proposed to
be erected in their churchyards.'72 A statute enacted during the
reign of Charles II, ostensibly aimed at promoting the domestic
textile industry, required deceased individuals to be buried in
woolen clothes, excluding more lavish burial attire.'73 A parishioner
could opt to be buried in an iron coffin if he paid an additional fee to
the church.'74
Because burial and "protection of the grave" was a matter for the
church, the common law did not recognize "property in a corpse."'75
169 In two related cases from the seventeenth century, the royal courts suggested that the
discretion lay in the incumbent of the church. See Day v. Beddingfield, (1615) 74 Eng.
Rep. 1070, 1070 (KB.) (holding that only parson can grant burial license); Frances v. Ley,
(1615) 79 Eng. Rep. 314, 315 (Star Chamber) (same); see also PETER SHERLOCK, MONUMENTS
AND MEMORY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 176 (2008) (discussing Frances v. Ley litigation).
In 1867, however, the Privy Council held that the discretion to approve a family vault in a
church or chapel lay with the Ordinary, who could approve the request over the incumbent's
objection. See Rugg v. Kingsmill, (1867) 16 Eng. Rep. 445, 449-50 (P.C.) ("[Tihe Ordinary
would have jurisdiction over the vault itself."); JAMES BROOKE LITTLE, THE LAW OF
BURIAL 22-23 (3d ed. 1902) (discussing Rugg case).
17o See Exparte Blackmore, (1830) 109 Eng. Rep. 732, 733 (KB.) (holding that parishioner
had "no legal right" to specify burial location).
171 See Bardin v. Calcott, (1789) 161 Eng. Rep. 459, 460 (London Consistory Ct.) (noting
that "there can be no absolute claim" by a stranger to be buried in parish). It may have been
necessary to secure the approval of the parson as well. See 1 RICHARD BURN, THE
ECCLEsIASTICAL LAW 258-258a (Robert Phillimore ed., London, Sweet, Stevens & Norton 9th
ed. 1842) (1763) (discussing a 1780 opinion on burying of strangers by George Harris, "[a] very
eminent civilian").
172 See, e.g., Maidman v. Malpas, (1794) 161 Eng. Rep. 526, 527 (London Consistory Ct.)
(holding that monuments cannot be erected without permission); Bardin, 161 Eng. Rep. at 459
(reserving ordinary's right to approve).
173 An Act for Burying in Woollen Onely, 1666, 18 & 19 Car. 2, c. 4 (Eng.).
174 See Gilbert v. Buzzard, (1820) 161 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1350-51 (London Consistory Ct.)
(requiring additional payment for iron coffin).
175 Regina v. Sharpe, (1857) 169 Eng. Rep. 959, 960 (Crim. App.). Contemporary English
law has moved away from this position. See, e.g., Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust,
[2009] EWCA (Civ) 37, 45(a) (appeal taken from Eng.) ('[D]evelopments in medical science
now require a re-analysis of the common law's treatment of and approach to the issue of
ownership of parts or products of a living human body.").
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In the 1882 case of Williams v. Williams, the Court of Chancery took
the next logical step and declared the law of wills to be irrelevant to
burial as well.1 6 In that case, Henry Crookenden left a codicil
directing that his body be given to a friend, Eliza Williams, and
instructed Williams to have his body cremated. 7 ' Crookenden's
widow buried the body instead and Williams subsequently received
permission from the Home Secretary to disinter the body so she
could cremate and rebury it. After Williams had the body burned,
she sued the executors for reimbursement of the cremation
expenses.' The court held that Williams was not entitled to
recovery because "a man cannot by will dispose of his dead body."179
Thus, more than three centuries after the Reformation, burial in
England remained essentially governed by the law of the church.8 0
In the United States, the lack of an established church forced
state courts and legislatures to rethink the rules relating to
disposition of the body. One early and influential treatment of the
issue came in the unlikely form of a report issued by a referee,
Samuel B. Ruggles, in a case involving the division of damages
occasioned by the widening of a New York street.'8 ' Because the
proposed widening necessitated the taking of certain burial vaults,
Ruggles took the opportunity to examine the law relating to burial
and its historical development in England and elsewhere.'82 Ruggles
ultimately inferred several conclusions from the fact that New York
lacked an established church, including "[tihat the right to bury a
corpse and to preserve its remains, is a legal right, which the courts
of law will recognize and protect," and "[tihat such right, in the
absence of any testamentary disposition, belongs exclusively to the
next of kin."8 3 By acknowledging testamentary disposition, Ruggles
left open the possibility that the last wishes of the decedent could be
176 (1882) 20 Ch.D. 659.
177 Id. at 659-60.
178 Id. at 661.
179 Id. at 665.
180 Under the 1832 Anatomy Act, however, an individual had the right to direct in writing
that his body be examined (or not) for scientific purposes. An Act for Regulating Schools of
Anatomy, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 75, §§ 7-8 (Eng.).
181 In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Bradf. app. at 503 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1856).
182 See id. at 516-31 (discussing history of burial law).
183 Id. at 532.
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given precedence over the intentions of the decedent's surviving
relatives.
Although much of Ruggles's report had no relevance to the case
he was appointed to resolve, his learned discussion had a wide-
ranging impact on the subsequent development of the American law
of burial."M In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
however, American courts generally did not conclude that
testamentary directions with regard to the body would take
precedence over all else. Rather, courts tended to hold that the
decedent's wishes would be entitled to "respectful consideration," but
that the preferences of the testator's family were also relevant." 5
Cases on the subject often concerned claims by a surviving spouse
against third parties who mutilated or mistreated the decedent's
body,"8 6 or conflicts between the deceased's family members in which
the last wishes of the decedent were aligned with the preference of
the spouse.8 7 When there was a direct conflict between the
decedent's wishes and those of close family members, courts
generally upheld the latter. For example, in a 1900 case involving
an attempted testamentary delegation of burial decisions to a
nonrelative, the California Supreme Court declined to enforce the
will, citing Williams and state statutes on burial duties. l8 In a 1902
case, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the last wishes of the
decedent might give way to the preference of his next of kin.8 9
' See R.F. Martin, Removal and Reinterment of Remains, 21 A.L.R.2d 472 § 4(b) (1952)
(discussing report's influence on American burial law). For some early citations to the Ruggles
report, see Bogert v. City of Indianapolis, 1859 WL 4747, at *3 n.1 (Ind. 1859); Wynkoop v.
Wynkoop, 1861 WL 5486, at *6-7 (Pa. 1862); and Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point
Cemetery, 1872 WL 3582, at *5 (R.I. 1872).
185 Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879-80 (Pa. 1904).
' See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 24-25 (Ga. 1905)
(allowing widow to sue railroad for improper care of her late husband's body); Larson v.
Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238 (Minn. 1981) (recognizing cause of action on behalf of widow for
unlawful mutilation and dissection of late husband).
1"7 See, e.g., Johnston v. Marinus, 18 Abb. N. Cas. 72, 72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1886) (recognizing
right of husband to dispose of deceased wife's body in accordance with her wishes).
188 See Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170, 171-72 (Cal. 1900) (upholding rights of testator's widow
and daughter).
18" See McEntee v. Bonacum, 92 N.W. 633, 634 (Neb. 1902) ("That a dying request by a




Courts generally took an individualized approach in such cases,
exercising broad discretion to resolve family conflicts. 9 °
Over the years, American law has gradually moved toward
embracing the principle of testamentary freedom with regard to the
disposition of human remains.' 9 ' Nevertheless, the law of burial has
retained a focus on the interests of the decedent's family-interests
that sometimes coexist uneasily with freedom of testation.'92 When
a testator names someone other than a spouse or biological relative
as the custodian of his or her remains, it is not certain that the
nonrelative's choices will be respected in the event that those choices
conflict with those of the testator's legally-defined family.'93 An
individual who wishes to override the preferences of family members
may make prepaid arrangements with a funeral home, hoping that
matters will be handled according to the contract before the next of
kin are able to interfere.' Therefore, while the American law of
burial has veered far from its English origins, state courts have not
yet demonstrated a commitment to the wishes of the dead that can
withstand family resistance.
B. COPYRIGHT
Although the right to direct the disposition of the body at death
may have some relevance to postmortem publicity rights, copyright
law may provide a closer analogue. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
190 See Foster, supra note 65, at 1385-98 (discussing such cases).
191 See, e.g., Kasmer v. Guardianship of Limner, 697 So. 2d 220, 220-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (requiring personal representatives to carry out decedent's wish to be cremated);
Briggs v. Hemstreet-Briggs, 681 N.Y.S.2d 853,855 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that an expressed
wish to be buried near decedent's first spouse can prevail even if second, surviving spouse
disapproves).
19 See Tanya K Hernindez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971,982-89 (1999)
(detailing tensions between courts' recognition of testamentary freedom and familial
preferences); cf Ann M. Murphy, Please Don't Bury Me Down in That Cold Cold Ground: The
Need for Uniform Laws on the Disposition of Human Remains, 15 ELDER L.J. 381, 398-99
(2007) ("Courts... have recognized a decedent's right to dictate the disposition of his or her
remains. There are, however, limits on this right.").
193 See Herndndez, supra note 192, at 983-84 (noting courts' preferences for the wishes of
the family); cf Stewart v. Schwartz Bros.-Jeffer Mem'l Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965,967-68
(App. Div. 1993) (noting that testamentary directions are "usually paramount to all other
considerations, including the objections of the next of kin" (emphasis added)).
'" See Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers, Clients, and AIDS: Some Notes from the Trenches, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 901 (1989) (recommending this option as part of planning one's estate).
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Broadcasting Co., for example, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly
compared the right of publicity to patents and copyrights on the
ground that, like those other rights, the right of publicity "provides
an economic incentive . . . to make the investment required to
produce a performance of interest to the public."195 As discussed
above, this argument has its flaws.'96 Before one could seriously
consider a forced-heirship scheme for rights of publicity, however,
one would need to take into account the history of testamentary
freedom in the copyright context. Unlike state inheritance law, the
federal law of copyright has tended to privilege the interests of the
family over the wishes of the decedent. As will be discussed,
however, this tendency in copyright law is best explained as an
historical accident, which modern scholars have criticized as lacking
any sound policy justification.
Copyright law in the United States traces its origins to a British
statute enacted during the eighth year of Queen Anne's reign,
referred to as the "Statute of Anne."'97 This 1710 statute established
a two-term renewal system for copyrights in England and
Scotland. 9 ' Under the statute, authors could assign a copyright to
a printer for fourteen years, but at the end of the term the copyright
would revert to the author, if living, for another fourteen years.'99
The purpose of this renewal provision was to give authors an
opportunity to sell their copyrights a second time if the work had
become more valuable at the end of the first term.2 °°
In 1790, the U.S. Congress enacted the first federal copyright
statute, and adopted the two-term renewal system used in the
Statute of Anne.2°' Because the renewal rights only vested if the
author survived the original term, the renewal provisions in
195 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
19 See supra Part II.B.1.
197 Copyright Act, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.); see Tritt, supra note 66, at 144-47
(analyzing evolution of copyright law). The statute is sometimes erroneously cited as having
been enacted in 1709, when in fact it was enacted the following year. See HARRY RANSOM, THE
FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 98 (1956) (providing explanation for confusion of details).
198 Copyright Act, § 1; RANSOM, supra note 197, at 104.
199 Copyright Act, §§ 1, 11.
200 See RANSOM, supra note 197, at 104 (explaining author's options at the end of second
term).
20' See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831) (stating protections
provided by copyright and requirements for renewal).
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the 1790 Act and its British model did not impact estate planning.202
In 1831, however, Congress enacted a second federal copyright
statute.2 ' The 1831 statute extended the initial term to twenty-
eight years, and vested a right of renewal not only in the author, but
in the author's "widow, or child, or children" in the event that the
author died survived by such individuals.2°4 By granting a statutory
right of renewal to specified individuals, the 1831 Act effectively
created a protected inheritance under federal copyright law that
could conceivably trump any contrary provisions in the author's will,
resulting in what Francis Nevins has termed "will-bumping."2 °5
In 1909, Congress enacted a comprehensive revision of the
Copyright Act.2 °6 This time, the statute provided that in the event
an artist died during the initial term, and was not survived by a
spouse or children, the renewal rights would vest in "the author's
executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin."20 7
Commentators subsequently interpreted this provision to mean that,
during the initial term, an artist could only devise the renewal rights
to his spouse or children.2 8 In De Sylva v. Ballentine, the U.S.
Supreme Court described the 1909 Act as creating a "compulsory
bequest of the copyright to the designated persons."2 9 Although the
nature of this apparent forced share was never spelled out clearly in
case law, it served as a potential trap for estate planners who were
not familiar with federal copyright law.210
2o2 See Tritt, supra note 66, at 147-48 ("Any transfer of rights for the renewal term
essentially adeemed because no renewal term was available due to the author's death.").
203 See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870) (establishing second
copyright law in United States).
204 Id. §§ 1-2.
20" Francis M. Nevins, Jr., Copyright Law vs. Testamentary Freedom: The Sound of a
Collision Unheard, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47,48 (1988) (noting that estate planners are
often unaware of impact that federal copyright law might have on author's will); see also Tritt,
supra note 66, at 150-51 (describing how 1831 Act's language caused will-bumping).
20 See generally Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075 (revising Copyright Act).
207 Id. at 1081.
2s See Nevins, supra note 205, at 63 & n.62 (citing relevant authorities).
209 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956).
210 See Nevins, supra note 205, at 63 (noting general ignorance of copyright law among
estate planners); Michael Rosenbloum, Note, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict




In 1976, Congress eliminated the will-bumping provision for
works created after 1978, allowing those rights to "be bequeathed by
will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate
succession."21' Section 304 of the 1976 Act, however, retained the
will-bumping scheme for works created before 1978.212 More
importantly, the new provisions left open the possibility that an
artist's surviving spouse or children could nullify inter vivos
transfers such as transfers accomplished by revocable trusts. 213
Thus, while federal copyright law no longer interferes with
testamentary freedom in a literal sense, it may frustrate donative
intent in a wide variety of estate planning contexts.214 A proponent
of a forced-share regime in the publicity rights context could
therefore find some precedent in the historical treatment of
copyright under federal law, although the modern trend is toward
respecting the donor's intent.
C. PUBLICITY RIGHTS COMPARED
As discussed above, one of the most compelling justifications for
recognizing a right of publicity is that it gives a celebrity the power
to define the use of his or her image.215 Out of respect for the dead,
moreover, society may wish to protect the image of a deceased
celebrity from being used in a way that would conflict with the
celebrity's lifetime self-definition. 16 One might assume, however,
that close relatives of a deceased celebrity are likely to be the most
zealous guardians of his or her image, since they live in the shadow
of the celebrity's public identity. Why should the celebrity have the
power to divert the income stream associated with publicity rights
away from those persons who would be most damaged by misuse of
the rights?
211 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2006).
212 See id. § 304(a)(C)(ii) (providing will-bumping hierarchy).
213 See Tritt, supra note 66, at 166-67 (outlining estate-bumping effect).
214 See id. at 167-81 (noting interference with revocable trusts, lifetime transfers, family
holding entities, and charities).
... McKenna, supra note 144, at 231; see also supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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Such a power might be justified under a general argument that
Hirsch and Wang termed the "father knows best" hypothesis.217
According to this theory, testamentary freedom is preferable to
forced heirship because it permits "more intelligent estate planning":
the testator knows his or her family members better than anyone
else and can use that knowledge to achieve an ideal distribution of
the estate.21 One can question the validity of this general argument
on many grounds, 219 and it does not explain why celebrities should
have the power to devise their publicity rights to charity.
Nevertheless, the fact is that freedom of testation is the norm in
every American state.22 ° In the absence of a change in the law's
overall tolerance for testamentary freedom, any forced-heirship
scheme for publicity rights must rely on a finding that those rights
differ from other property rights in some significant way,
presumably because they are tightly bound with the celebrity's
personhood. This subpart will compare publicity rights to copyright
and the law of burial in order to assess whether the restrictions on
testamentary freedom historically present in those highly personal
contexts ought to extend to publicity rights as well.
Scholars who have considered the history of donative restrictions
in federal copyright law seem to agree that Congress imposed those
restrictions largely unintentionally. 221 When the author survived the
original copyright term and renewed the copyright himself, federal
law did not interfere with the author's testamentary freedom.22 If
paternalistic or moral concerns had been the primary motivation for
217 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 118, at 12.
218 See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 3.1, at 123-24 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining the
theory).
219 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 118, at 13 (criticizing father-knows-best argument on
grounds that many wills are drafted with little thought and testators cannot be relied upon
to make rational decisions).
220 Even in Louisiana, which protects some children from disinheritance, testamentary
freedom is the norm. See sources cited supra note 32.
221 See, e.g., Nevins, supra note 205, at 51 ("The legislative history suggests ... that will-
bumping entered the law essentially by inadvertence."); Tritt, supra note 66, at 154 ("The
silence in the legislative history ... indicates that Congress did not understand the impact of
the revised renewal system [in the 1831 Act] on testamentary freedom."); Rosenbloum, supra
note 210, at 168 ("The silence of history implies that Congress never realized that provisions
for copyright renewal would interfere with an individual's testamentary freedom.").
m See Tritt, supra note 66, at 151 (providing example of such non-interference).
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limiting the power to devise, Congress would likely have imposed the
same limitations when the author survived the initial term.
Moreover, in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress eliminated the will-
bumping provisions entirely for works created after January 1, 1978,
which means that copyright law no longer preempts contrary
provisions in an author's will.22 Although current copyright law
may continue to interfere with certain inter vivos will substitutes,
there is no good reason for this interference because it merely
reflects Congress's ignorance regarding contemporary estate
planning techniques.224 Thus, federal copyright law does little to
bolster the case for creating a forced share in postmortem publicity
rights.
The law of burial poses a more difficult problem, because there
may be valid reasons for deviating from the normal inheritance rules
when the disposition of the body is at stake. Empirical research
suggests that burial rituals can play a positive role in the family's
grieving process."' Grief is typically at its most intense for the six
months immediately following the death of a family member.226
Conflicts concerning appropriate burial rituals can "compound
mourners' already painful burden of acute grief with additional
afflictions borne out of adverse funeral events." 27 Thus, some
departure from the usual deference to the testator's intent may be
justified when the rituals of burial are at stake.
Even if testamentary freedom ought to be restricted in the burial
context, a position I do not take here, a celebrity's right of publicity
implicates entirely different concerns. Two examples can be
22 See id. at 157-59 (noting that will-bumping "cease[d] to be a problem on December 31,
2008").
22 See id. at 167-90 (denouncing present "estate-bumping" features of copyright law as
potentially unconstitutional and "unacceptable" on policy grounds).
' See Louis A. Gamino et al., Grief Adjustment as Influenced by Funeral Participation and
Occurrence ofAdverse Funeral Events, 41 OMEGA 79, 91 (2000) ("[Plarticipation in funeral and
burial rituals aids the affective adjustment of mourners grieving the loss of a loved one.").
226 See Paul K Maciejewski et al., An Empirical Examination of the Stage Theory of Grief,
J. AM. MED. Ass'N, Feb. 21, 2007, at 716, 722.
227 Gamino et al., supra note 225 (noting that "adverse events," including "conflicts among
survivors" and "decedent's wishes versus survivors' wishes," might contribute to "a perception
of the funeral rituals as not comforting").




provided. First, the process of disposing of a person's body typically
is profitable only for the funeral home, not for the decedent's
surviving relatives. 229 By contrast, postmortem publicity rights can
become extremely valuable for those who inherit them, at least in
rare cases like that of Marilyn Monroe.3 ° When a celebrity becomes
a cultural icon like Monroe, his or her publicity rights can remain
valuable for decades after his or her death.
Second, postmortem publicity rights are not subject to the overlay
of state and federal regulations that apply to cremation and burial.23'
While the English law of burial denied freedom of testation, English
law also limited the range of choices a family could make regarding
the disposition of the decedent's body.23 2 Had the family members
been free to bury the deceased in any manner they pleased, the law
might not have been so willing to disregard the testator's wishes.
Thus, the history of interference with testamentary funeral
instructions under the common law does not support a forced-
heirship scheme for long-term, unregulated publicity rights.
When a celebrity's image is misused, the celebrity's children may
suffer regardless of who inherited the publicity rights. If John
Lennon's image were used to sell handguns, for example, his sons
would most likely be upset even if Lennon had devised his publicity
rights to charity. 233 Nevertheless, the same might be true if a
229 Cf GARY LADERMAN, REST IN PEACE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF DEATH AND THE FUNERAL
HOME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURYAMERICA 179-94 (2003) (describing rise of so-called death-care
industry in late twentieth century). But cf Ron Franscell, Big Bopper's Casket a Macabre
Marketable on eBay, BEAUMONT ENTERPRISE, Dec. 27, 2008, http'//www.beaumontenterprise.
com/news/local/36759549.html (describing son's effort to auction off used casket of his long-
deceased but recently exhumed celebrity father).
20 Elvis Presley, John Lennon, and, more surprisingly, Albert Einstein are also examples
of deceased celebrities whose estates continue to enjoy a large income stream, although some
of the income, as in Lennon's case, comes from publishing royalties rather than publicity
rights. See Hoy, supra note 23; see also infra note 233 (discussing John Lennon's estate).
2' See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 229.1 (2008) (regulating burial at sea); FLA. STAT. §§ 497.270-.272,
.386, .607 (West 2009) (setting minimum acreage for cemeteries; adopting standards for
mausoleums; regulating storage, preservation, and transportation of human remains; and
specifying procedure for cremation). On this body of regulation, which is admittedly limited
in scope regarding disposition of remains, see Murphy, supra note 192, at 389-96.
232 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
23 Lennon, who died a resident of New York, devised the bulk of his estate to an inter vivos
trust. See The Last Will and Testament of John Lennon, http-/www.rockmine.comReaper/
LennWill.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (disposing of Lennon's estate). New York currently
does not recognize survivable rights of publicity, which has led Lennon's widow, Yoko Ono, and
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company incorporated the words to Lennon's ironic song Happiness
Is a Warm Gun into a handgun advertisement without using
Lennon's image,"' and yet current U.S. copyright law grants no
rights to an artist's children who are disinherited by will.235 In any
event, the abuse of Lennon's music or image would not just harm his
own children. This abuse would harm his millions of fans who
treasure his contribution to musical and cultural history. If we can
trust artists to choose the best protectors for their creative works,
why should we not trust them to do the same for their publicity
rights? 23
6
In summary, without considering tax concerns, the case for
recognizing a forced share for postmortem publicity rights (but not
for other forms of property) appears to be weak. Although freedom
of testation has historically been restrained concerning some other
personal rights, those historical restraints are either unwarranted
or based on considerations that do not apply in the publicity rights
context.237 In the decades since the recognition of postmortem
publicity rights, no evidence has emerged that allowing celebrities
to devise their rights of publicity to persons of their choosing causes
great hardship to grieving families or great offense to society as a
whole. The next Part will therefore consider whether a different
result must or should be reached when federal transfer taxes are
taken into consideration.
other celebrities to support bills creating retroactive survivable publicity rights similar to
those now recognized in California. See Decker, supra note 149, at 252-56 (discussing
developments in New York law governing publicity rights); Linda J. Wank & Elisabeth H.
Cavanagh, The Lasting Effect of Star Power, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 2007, at S1 (discussing
California law allowing transfer of publicity rights).
23 According to Lennon, he was inspired to write the song after reading the title of an
article in a gun magazine. DAVID SHEFF, ALL WE ARE SAYING: THE LAST MAJOR INTERVIEW
WITH JOHN LENNON AND YOKO ONO 188-89 (G. Barry Golson ed., 2000).
"3 See sources cited supra note 223.
236 Maximizing the wealth of one's descendants is not the sole conceivable goal of estate
planning. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor's Intent, The Uniform Trust
Code, and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1191 (2008) ("[Mlany
settlors engage in estate planning and establish trusts in order to benefit their chosen
beneficiaries in a variety of ways-not only financially, but also personally and perhaps even
spiritually.").
237 See supra Parts II.B-II.c.
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IV. TAXATION OF POSTMORTEM PUBLICITY RIGHTS
Since the early twentieth century, Congress has continuously
imposed taxes on gratuitous transfers of property. The 1916 estate
tax applied to transfers at death, while the 1924 gift tax covered
inter vivos gifts.23 Decades later, Congress enacted a third tax (the
GST tax) to capture certain generation-skipping transfers missed by
the earlier statutes. 29  Federal transfer taxes are levied on
intangible property as well as tangible assets,2 40 and would thus
extend to a celebrity's right of publicity.24' In two essays published
in the Yale Law Journal Pocket Part, however, Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr argue that states could immunize publicity rights from
federal transfer taxation by vesting them automatically in specified
statutory heirs of the celebrity, unless the celebrity opted to destroy
the rights inter vivos. 242 If such measures are adopted, the authors
argue, the rights will be excluded from the gross estate under § 2033
of the Code, which governs property owned by the decedent at
death.243
This Part will explain how the proposal of Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr would be problematic under current law and unjustified
in light of familiar policy considerations. If there is a case for
excluding property from the gross estate on the basis of a state
statute limiting freedom of testation, it has yet to be made. I will
then discuss the more vexing question of how postmortem publicity
rights should be valued for tax purposes. Although Congress could
alter the tax code to reduce the tax valuation of the rights, this
23 The original 1924 gift tax was repealed shortly after its enactment, but a gift tax was
reenacted in 1932, and has remained in effect ever since. See 5 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 120.1, at 120-1 to -2 (2d ed.
1993).
"9 The GST tax was originally enacted in 1976, but was repealed and replaced with a
substantially revised version in 1986. See id. 133.1, at 133-2 to -3.
240 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2031(a), 2511(a) (2006) (describing transfers to which gift and estate
taxes apply).
"1 See Estate of Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279, 1295 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(holding deceased author's name to be asset of her estate).
22 See sources cited supra note 39.
2 See Gans et al., Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 50, 53 (characterizing "post-death
control" of public rights as necessary prerequisite for § 2033 inclusion).
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change could have the undesirable effect of discouraging charitable
bequests.
A. CURRENT LAW
In their second Pocket Part essay, Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr call attention to what they refer to as a "bedrock
principle" of the federal estate tax: that "inclusion under § 2033 is
not appropriate unless the decedent has the right to control the post-
death disposition of the interest."2" While the decedent's post-death
control over an asset may have some relevance to its inclusion in the
decedent's gross estate, this does not mean that federal transfer
taxation may be avoided in every situation where testamentary
freedom is restricted.
To take one example suggested by Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr, 245 suppose that S creates an irrevocable inter vivos trust
specifying that the income will be paid to A for life, and then the
remainder will belong to B at A's death. It is well-established that
when A dies, any trust property that was not distributed to A will
not fall under § 2033, as the termination of A's life interest is not a
taxable transfer under the Code.2" Although estate tax will not be
levied at A's death, however, other federal transfer taxes may apply.
If B is S's granddaughter, the GST tax will now apply to the
termination of A's life estate in order to ensure that such
intergenerational transfers do not avoid federal transfer taxation.247
Moreover, regardless of the identity of B, the initial transfer by S
244 Id. at 50.
245 See id. at 52 (noting that § 2033 would not apply in situation where interest in trust
terminates at death).
246 5 BI"rKER & LOKKEN, supra note 238, 125.5, at 125-10 to -13; 133.1, at 133-3.
17 For statutes defining the GST tax and explaining its applicability, see 26 U.S.C.
§§ 2601, 2611-2612, 2613(a)(1) (2006). For commentary on these provisions, see 5 BITKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 238, 133.1, at 133-3. Because each taxpayer has a lifetime GST
exemption, however, widespread abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities may be frustrating
this purpose of the GST tax. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional
Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuitis and Taxes, 115 YALE
L.J. 356, 359-63 (2005) (discussing states' abolition of Rule Against Perpetuities in order to
attract trust assets).
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may be a taxable gift, in which case the gift tax would be imposed at
the creation of both A's life estate and B's remainder.2
The taxability of A's life estate at its creation may partly explain
why Congress and the courts have never deemed A to have a taxable
interest "at the time of his death" for purposes of § 2033.249 Rather,
A's life estate is viewed as having disappeared at the moment of
death. Furthermore, because A has no other interest in the
underlying asset, he owns nothing that can be transferred at death
or taxed under § 2033. By contrast, if S were to transfer a
remainder interest in the property while retaining a life estate for
himself, the property would be included in his gross estate.25 °
Although a voluntary release of dominion and control may be an
occasion for imposing the gift tax, a limitation on control rights
imposed by a state statute may not yield the same result. It is
noteworthy that the U.S. Tax Court does not consider a spouse's
elective-share rights under state law when determining the inclusion
of the applicable assets in the gross estate under § 2033.251 Elective-
share statutes, adopted in some separate-property states, protect a
certain percentage of the property for the surviving spouse, who can
2 See 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)(1) (imposing gift tax); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176,
178-81 (1943) (imposing gift tax upon life estate and contingent remainder).
249 This is not the only way the statute could logically be construed. See 5 BIrTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 238, 125.5, at 125-10 ("The statutory language... could, with equal
plausibility, be interpreted to fix upon either the instant before death or the instant after
death."). While the Revenue Act of 1916 imposed an estate tax "[t]o the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death which after his death is subject to the payment
of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its administration and is subject to
distribution as part of his estate," H.R. 16763,64th Cong. § 202(a) (1916) (emphasis added), the
qualifying language was eliminated by the Revenue Act of 1926, which stated simply that the
tax is imposed "t]o the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."
Pub. L. No. 20, § 302(a), 44 Stat. (pt. 2) 9, 70 (1926). Section 2033 of the current Code does not
include the deleted language, which indicates that Congress intended § 2033 to be construed
broadly. See H.R. REP. No. 69-1, § 302 (1925), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 315, 325 (stating
that the language was eliminated "[iln the interest of certainty" so that "the gross estate shall
include the entire interest of the decedent at the time of his death in all the property").
250 See 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a) (describing gross estate as including "all property to the extent
of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case
of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust
or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death").
21 Estate of Frost v. Comm'r, No. 17333-89 1993, WL 75053, at *14 (T.C. Mar. 18, 1993)
(holding that properties that spouse claimed as portions of her statutory elective share were
subject to federal estate tax).
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elect to take that property notwithstanding the decedent spouse's
will. 252  In Estate of Frost, the decedent's widow exercised her
statutory rights to take certain properties notwithstanding the
provisions of her husband's will, but subsequently entered into a
settlement agreement with the other devisees by which she gave up
her rights to those properties.253 The court held that the properties
subject to the settlement did not qualify for the marital deduction,
and that the "properties, as part of decedent's Estate, were plainly
subject to Federal estate tax under section 2033.254 The elective
share limited the post-death control of the testator, but it did not
take the properties out of his gross estate. 5
For present purposes, what is most telling about the Frost case is
that the Tax Court did not hold the assets in question to be part of
the gross estate by reference to § 2034, the Code section that
specifically includes a surviving spouse's interest "by virtue of a
statute creating an estate in lieu of dower or curtesy."256 Rather, the
court invoked § 2033, the general provision governing property
owned by the decedent at death.257 In general, the forced nature of
252 See Turnipseed, supra note 32, at 739 (finding that although state elective-share
statutes vary, one common provision guarantees one-third of decedent's estate for surviving
spouse if decedent left surviving issue, or one-half if decedent left no surviving issue). In an
effort to implement the so-called partnership theory of marriage, the 1990 Uniform Probate
Code applies the elective share to the "augmented estate," which includes certain nonprobate
transfers by the decedent, and awards the surviving spouse a percentage of the property that
varies depending on the length of the marriage. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to -213
(1990) (discussing elective share rules); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our
Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 683, 724 (1992) (stating that 1990 Uniform Probate Code aligned elective share with
partnership theory of marriage); see also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 4.09 cmt. c, at 735 (2002) (explaining partnership theory of marriage, which
presumes each spouse contributed equally to marriage). But cf Laura A. Rosenbury, Two
Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1282-89 (criticizing
partnership theory as inconsistent with goals of modern feminists).
25 Frost, 1993 WL 75053, at *7-8.
2 Id. at *14.
255 Id.
256 26 U.S.C. § 2034(2006). On the evolution of elective-share statutes from the common-
law right of dower, see Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the
Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1684-86 (2003).
" See also Schroeder v. United States, 924 F.2d 1547, 1549 (10th Cir. 1991) (reporting
executor's inclusion of spousal election share under § 2033). The legislative history suggests
that § 2034 was introduced solely for clarification. Congress added the predecessor to § 2034
to the Code "for the purpose of making it clear that [dower and curtesy interests] are to be
included," because "[t] he distinction between dower and curtesy interest and property passing
2009] IMMORTAL FAME 47
an inheritance right does not impact its transfer tax status under
the Code.25  Most states do not protect descendants from
disinheritance, with the limited exception of Louisiana.259 This,
together with the marital deduction, may explain why courts and
commentators have hitherto devoted little attention to the
theoretical consequences of state forced-share statutes under § 2033.
If forced-share statutes offered protection from federal estate
taxation, one would expect to see taxpayers in Louisiana-where a
limited forced share applies to some descendants-invoking that
protection.26 ° Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr seem to concede that
this does not occur.26'
One factor that serves to distinguish an ordinary life estate from
property subject to a statutory forced share at death is that a life
tenant cannot, acting alone, transfer an interest in the property that
to wife or husband by will or intestate succession is technical rather than real, at least in the
consideration of the question as to whether they should be subject to estate tax." H.R. REP.
No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1918), in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 86, 101. But see Gans et al.,
Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 52-53 (arguing that § 2034 would be "superfluous" if
inclusion in gross estate did not require post-death control). Estate of Johnson, cited by Gans
et al., Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 52 n.13, held that homestead rights were included
under § 2034, but expressly declined to reach the question of whether they would also be
included under § 2033. Estate of Johnson v. Comm'r, 718 F.2d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1983).
' See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-51-001 (Aug. 8, 1986) ("[Hlomestead rights, being in the
nature of a forced testamentary disposition, are no more subject to discounting than any other
testamentary disposition, forced or unforced."); cf Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 505
(1964) (disallowing marital deduction for statutory "widow's allowance" payable to surviving
spouse during settlement of husband's estate). The Supreme Court has clearly stated that
limitations on testamentary succession with respect to certain assets do not deprive those
assets of their property status. See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942)
("Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or
even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.");
Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490, 493-94 (1850) ("Every state or nation may
unquestionably refuse to allow an alien to take either real or personal property, situated
within its limits, either as heir or legatee, and may, if it thinks proper, direct that property so
descending or bequeathed shall belong to the state.").
259 See Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask To Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance
and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1198
& n.3 (1990) (contrasting children's protection under intestacy law with limited protections
against disinheritance); Tate, supra note 58, at 131-32, 137-40 (comparing American law on
disinheritance with that of other nations).
260 Tate, supra note 42, at 41.
261 See Gans et al., Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 52-53 (distinguishing tax
insignificance of Louisiana legitime as "based on a narrow regulatory exception to the
pervasive general rule").
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extends beyond his or her lifetime. 2  Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr have not explained what restrictions, if any, they would
impose on a celebrity's ability to transfer an interest in the
celebrity's publicity rights inter vivos. If a forced-heirship regime
lacked restrictions on the power of lifetime transfer, a celebrity
would arguably have an interest analogous to a general inter vivos
power of appointment. This would result in inclusion of publicity
rights in the gross estate regardless of whether the power is
exercised.2 63 To avoid this result, the statute would need to nullify
any transfer made by the celebrity to her creditors, among other
potential transferees. 2' Although an individual may retain some
transfer rights without being treated as the owner of the property for
federal estate tax purposes," 5 Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr do
not spell out what lifetime powers a celebrity might retain with
respect to his or her publicity rights under their hypothetical
statute, except to say that the celebrity would be "precluded... from
exercising post-death control."
266
One purpose of recognizing an interest as property is to allow its
transfer.267 If the abolition of "post-death control" means limiting a
262 See 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 64 (1966) (stating that transferee of life estate receives life
estate pur autre vie, or "during the life of another")
263 See 26 U.S.C. § 2041(a)(2) (2006) (stating that property is includible in gross estate
when decedent "has at the time of his death a general power of appointment created after
October 21, 1942 ... whether or not on or before the date of the decedent's death ... the power
has been exercised"). One might also analogize the proposed arrangement to a buy-sell
securities agreement in which the decedent retains the right to dispose of the underlying
assets at a certain price during his lifetime. When lifetime control is retained,
such agreements are disregarded for purposes of estate tax valuation. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-2(h) (as amended 1963) (noting the presumption that such agreements are not "bona
fide business arrangement[s]" and therefore stated price will not be used for tax purpose
unless presumption is rebutted); 4 JACOB RABIUN & MARK H. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GiFT
AND ESTATE TAXATION § 52.13[9], at 52-127 to -128 (Supp. 2008) (listing Tax Court decisions
that support the refusal to recognize such a contract for tax purposes); see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 2703(b) (specifying limited conditions under which agreements to acquire market property
at less than fair market value may affect transfer tax valuation).
264 See, e.g., Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that a decedent's
power to withdraw principal from a trust did not result in the property's inclusion in his gross
estate when decedent and his cotrustees were "governed by determinable standards").
2 5 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A) (deeming powers that are "limited by an
ascertainable standard relating to ... health, education, support, or maintenance" not to be
general powers of appointment).
26 Gans et al., Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 50.
267 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 489 cmt. a (1944) ("The policy of the law has
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celebrity's transferable right to a lifetime interest, this will make it
difficult for the celebrity to exploit the rights commercially.
Potential licensees may place a lower value on a celebrity's publicity
rights if their licenses could be arbitrarily terminated by the
celebrity's death.268 Moreover, statutory limitations on the lifetime
transfer of publicity rights, coupled with the abolition of
testamentary freedom, might constitute a taking requiring just
compensation under the U.S. Constitution in states recognizing
postmortem rights.269
In support of their argument that a forced share for publicity
rights would result in exclusion from the gross estate, Gans,
Crawford, and Blattmachr point to a line of cases involving employee
death benefits.27 ° These cases involve contracts in which an
employer promises to pay a benefit to the surviving spouse or
children of an employee, such as the company president, in return
for that employee's continued service to the company. 1 Although
been, in general, in favor of a high degree of alienability of property interests."); Jessica
Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1295 (2000) ("The
raison d'9tre of property is alienability.... ."). For this reason, some have argued that publicity
rights should be reachable as property in bankruptcy proceedings. See Melissa B. Jacoby &
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of
the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1327 (2002) (discussing creditors' interest in
treating publicity rights as property).
268 See Westfall & Landau, supra note 30, at 88 (discussing merits of various policy
arguments favoring postmortem publicity rights).
269 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987) ("[Clomplete abolition of both the
descent and devise of a particular class of property may be a taking.... ."); Ronald Chester, Is
the Right to Devise Property Constitutionally Protected?-The Strange Case of Hodel v.
Irving, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 1195, 1208-09 (1995) (noting that, under recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence, abolition of testamentary freedom may constitute taking when right of inter
vivos transfer is restricted); see also Ascher, supra note 53, at 137 ("[Tlhe ability to make gifts
seems such an important component of the bundle of sticks we call property that abolition of
gifts is essentially unthinkable, and probably should be."); Adam Mossoff, Patents as
Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings
Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 724 (2007) (noting that Takings Clause has historically been
applied to intangible property rights such as patents); Tritt, supra note 66, at 132 ("[Tlhe
Court has placed some doubts as to what remains of the unfettered historical right of
individual states to limit testamentary freedom.. . ."). Cf Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) ("[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking."); But see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)
("[T]he denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking.").
270 See Gans et al., Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 51-52 (criticizing my interpretation
of § 2033).
271 See, e.g., Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1364-66 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (involving
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Congress enacted a specific provision of the Code in 1954 to cover
survivor's benefits due under annuity contracts, that provision does
not cover payments that the decedent had no right to receive during
life.272 In various cases, the Service has tried different arguments in
an effort to tax those payments, but has met limited success. 7
In Kramer v. United States and Estate of Wadewitz v.
Commissioner, two cases cited by Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr,27 4 the Service claimed that all payments due under the
employment contracts should be included in the gross estate of each
employee under § 2033. The courts rejected this argument on the
ground that the employees had no survivable interest in their
respective contracts that could pass by will or intestacy.275 By
contrast, in Estate of DiMarco v. Commissioner, the Service
contended that the employee's participation in a benefits plan
constituted a taxable gift to the surviving spouse.27 This argument
was also rejected, and the court held that the employee in question
never had a transferable interest in the benefits plan.277 In all of
these cases, the beneficiary was designated by terms of the relevant
employment contract or benefits plan, and the employee had no
power to substitute a different individual to receive the benefits.27
The Service was finally able to prevail in Estate of Levin v.
contract by which employer promised to pay employee's spouse weekly compensation in event
of employee's death); Estate ofWadewitz v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 925,926-30 (1963), affd sub nom.
In re Wadewitz' Estate, 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964) (involving contract in which employer was
obligated to pay benefit to employee's wife and daughter in event of employee's death).
272 26 U.S.C. § 2039 (2006); see Silberman v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 1120,1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1971) (noting that "[a]n annuity or other payment must have been payable to the decedent
or the decedent must have possessed the right to receive the same" in order for the interest to
be included under § 2039). For an argument that § 2039 should be amended to cover "pure"
death benefits, see Bruce Wolk, The Pure Death Benefit: An Estate and Gift Tax Anomaly, 66
MINN. L. REV. 229, 277-82 (1982).
273 See infra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
274 Gans et al., Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 51-52.
275 See Kramer, 406 F.2d at 1369-70 ("The decedent's interest in the employment contract
ceased at his death."); Wadewitz, 39 T.C. at 930, 935 (holding that interest in contract could
not pass by will or intestacy); see also Estate of Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1401, 1406-07
(Ct. Cl. 1976) (reaching same conclusion).
276 87 T.C. 653, 657-58 (1986) (discussing the Service's contentions).
277 See id. at 661-62 (discussing bases for holding).
278 See, e.g., Kramer, 406 F.2d at 1369 (finding terminable interest in employment




Commissioner by arguing that an employee had made a revocable
transfer of a property interest under § 2038, but the employee in
that case had indirect control over the annuity in question."9
Even after its losses in Wadewitz and Kramer, the Service did not
entirely concede the inapplicability of § 2033 in the employee
benefits context.2 0 Employee benefits cases posed a special problem
for the Service, however, because the employee typically did not have
and could not transfer an ownership interest prior to his death in the
assets used to pay the survivor.28 ' For the same reason, the Service
had difficulty levying estate taxes on wrongful death benefits, which
are a postmortem obligation imposed on property that belonged to
the tortfeasor before the injured party's death.28 2 Because the
decedent's death created the interests, and those interests belonged
to another party until the moment of the decedent's death, courts
were reluctant to find them covered by § 2033 of the code.28 3
In their original Pocket Part essay, Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr compared postmortem publicity rights to wrongful death
claims 4.28  Their second essay, written in response to my critique of
the first, places more emphasis on the supposed similarity of
279 90 T.C. 723, 730-31 (1988), affd, 891 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that decedent
retained power to amend or revoke annuity payable to his widow).
m See, e.g., Tully, 528 F.2d at 1401, action on dec., 1976-386 (Oct. 14, 1976)
("[Slection 2033 should still be argued where the death benefit is a mere continuation of a
payment that the decedent was receiving and would have received had he lived.").
"' See DiMarco, 87 T.C. at 663-64 (concluding that decedent-employee never possessed
a transferable interest in income benefits). A surviving spouse's lump-sum Social Security
death payment poses a similar problem. See Rev. Rul. 67-277, 1967-2 C.B. 322,323 (excluding
such benefits from gross estate in part because "decedent had no property interest in the
'Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund' from which the payment is made").
282 See Conn. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 465 F.2d 760, 763 (2d Cir. 1972)
(excluding wrongful death benefits from gross estate).
m See 5 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 238, 1 125-6, at 125-13 ("[Section] 2033 seems to
cover only property in which the decedent had some interest while living."); cf. Rev. Rul. 82-5,
1982-1 C.B. 131, 131 ("Survivors' loss benefits paid under a no-fault automobile insurance
policy are not property in which the decedent had an interest at death."). As a policy matter,
it may be difficult to justify the exclusion of either wrongful death claims determined on the
basis of the decedent's wages or employee death benefits from the transfer tax base. See Harry
L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax
Restructuing, 41 TAX LAW. 653, 663 (1988) (arguing that no "serious" policy argument can be
made for such exclusions).
' See Gans et al., Postmortem Rights, supra note 39, at 207-08 ("An unrestricted
postmortem publicity right that survives a decedent's death likely will receive estate tax
treatment similar to certain tort claims that survive a decedent's death.").
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postmortem publicity rights to employee death benefits.2" Absent
further elaboration, both analogies share the same flaw: publicity
rights are owned by the decedent at death, not by a third party such
as a tortfeasor or employer. The result might be different if state
law reduced a celebrity's lifetime interest in his or her publicity
rights to something less than ownership, but Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr have not yet specified to what extent, if at all, they are
willing to eviscerate a celebrity's inter vivos right of publicity.
28 6
Moreover, Congress has the power not only to tax the transfer of
property at death, but also the creation at death of new legal
privileges incident to property.287 Even if state law drastically limits
' See Gans et al., Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 50-52 (discussing Kramer and
Wadewitz). Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr point to Paul L. Caron, Estate Planning
Implications of the Right of Publicity, 68 TAXNOTES 95,95 (1995), available at http-//ssrn.com
abstract=1426629, as evidence that "[o]thers have recognized that publicity rights cannot be
included in a decedent's estate, absent post-death control." Gans et al., Fundamentals, supra
note 39, at 50 n.3. The quoted passage in Caron's article, however, states merely that
inclusion in the gross estate depends on the right of publicity being "a property interest
recognized under the applicable state law and descendible to the decedent's heirs." Caron,
supra, at 95 (emphasis added). The dispute between Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr and
myself concerns whether publicity rights should be devisable, not on whether they are
descendible. Under the proposal of Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr, the right of publicity
would pass to the specified statutory heirs unless the celebrity destroyed it inter vivos. Gans
et al., Postmortem Rights, supra note 39, at 208-09. Thus, the right would be "capable of
passing by descent or being inherited," which is the definition of"descendible." BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIONARY 510 (9th ed. 2009). Nevertheless, Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr cite Caron's
article to support the proposition that "Professor Tate's analysis misconstrues fundamental
estate tax principles and misunderstands the precedents on which he relies." Gans et al.,
Fundamentals, supra note 39, at 50 & n.3.
'2 Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr do suggest that the celebrity might be given the power
to destroy the publicity rights inter vivos, thus preempting the forced share. See supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text. As I have argued previously, a celebrity who failed to
exercise that right would effectively make a devise to the statutory heirs, which would
certainly be taxable. Tate, supra note 42, at 41. Individuals do not have a right to renounce
an interest in property without tax consequences, See Jewett v. Comm'r, 455 U.S. 305, 317
(1982) (rejecting argument that taxpayer had right to renounce property interest without tax
consequences); see also Ordway v. United States, 908 F.2d 890, 894-95 & n.8 (l1th Cir. 1990)
(noting that Congress and the Service have specified that only qualified disclaimers of property
may escape taxation); cf Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49,60-61 (1999) (holding that federal
tax lien may attach to interest disclaimed by insolvent heir because "[hie determines who will
receive the property-himself if he does not disclaim, a known other if he does"); Estate of
Buckwalter v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 805, 815-17 (1966) (treating cancellation by will of debt owed
to decedent as equivalent to devise to debtor). For the reasons discussed in this subpart,
publicity rights owned by a celebrity at death would be taxable even in the absence of such a
power to destroy.
"8 As the Supreme Court has stated,
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the celebrity's lifetime interest, it is ultimately up to Congress to
determine whether a forced-share statute would result in the
exclusion of postmortem publicity rights from the gross estate.28
The next subpart will accordingly consider whether such an
exclusion would be justified on policy grounds.
B. TAX POLICY AND FORCED HEIRSHIP
Modern scholars generally agree that the federal estate tax, to the
extent that it can be justified, should be designed to serve some
normative policy goal or goals.2"9 Although many such goals have
been proposed, five are of particular importance: (1) supporting the
progressive nature of the income tax; (2) "backstopping" the income
tax system to ensure that certain income does not escape taxation;
(3) preventing dynastic accumulation of wealth over multiple
generations; (4) promoting equality of opportunity among the
citizenry; and (5) recognizing the role of the state as a "silent
partner" in the accumulation of wealth.290
It is enough that death brings about changes in the legal and economic
relationships to the property taxed, and the earlier certainty that those
changes would occur does not impair the legislative power to recognize
them, and to levy a tax on the happening of the event which was their
generating source.
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 356-57 (1945).
" See, e.g., Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940) (noting that, although "[sitate
law creates legal interests and rights," federal law determines what state property interests
will be taxed under the Code).
"8 See Fleischer, supra note 76, at 267-68 & n.14 (citing relevant literature); see also M.C.
Mirow & Bruce A. McGovern, An Obituary of the Federal Estate Tax, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 625, 627
(2001) (noting that support for tax has historically crossed class lines). This does not
necessarily mean that the present system of federal transfer taxes is particularly well-
designed to serve those goals. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from
Heirs? A Proposal for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax 3-7 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law, Econ., &
Org., Working Paper No. 08-42, 2008), available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=1274466
(advocating replacement of current estate tax regime with comprehensive inheritance tax);
Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Turning Slogans into Tax Policy, 27 VA. TAX
REV. 747, 780 (2008) (arguing that the Bush Administration produced "hopelessly complex and
inherently unstable" transfer tax legislation); William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, Overview, in
RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFt TAXATION 1, 55-58 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) (noting
criticism of current scheme).
29 See Fleischer, supra note 76, at 268 (listing social goals of estate tax); see also PENNELL,
supra note 54, at 11 (discussing "silent partner" justification).
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This subpart argues that shielding postmortem publicity rights
from federal transfer taxation on the basis of a state forced-share
statute, as Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr envision, would further
none of these fundamental policy goals and would directly conflict
with at least some of them. My aim is not to evaluate the different
arguments made in defense of the federal estate tax, but merely to
show that none of those arguments justifies excluding property,
especially postmortem publicity rights, from the gross estate on the
basis of a state forced-share statute.
Two of the key policy goals identified for the federal estate tax
focus on its interaction with the income tax-supporting the
progressive nature of the income tax and "backstopping" the income
tax system.291  For most of the twentieth century, progressive
taxation, in which those with a greater ability to pay are asked to
pay more, was a cornerstone of American tax policy.292 Although the
concept of progressive taxation has its critics as well as its
defenders, its historical centrality to the federal income tax cannot
be denied.293 Michael Graetz accordingly argues that the estate tax
helps to preserve the income tax's progressivity, because an income
tax alone, given political constraints, cannot "sufficiently tax the
underlying wealth that generated the income."294 Along similar
lines, Harry Gutman contends that the estate tax serves as a
"backstop" to the income tax, in that it taxes unrealized appreciation
of property held until the decedent's death, which otherwise would
escape taxation.295 These scholars accordingly defend the estate tax
as one component of the broader federal taxation scheme--a
211 See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
29 See MICHAEL J. GRAETz & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 267 (2005) (calling progressive taxation fundamental to American
policy).
" For a famous critique of progressive taxation, see Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417, 417-19 (1952). Blum and
Kalvin nonetheless acknowledge the concept as "one of the central ideas of modern democratic
capitalism." Id. For one response, see Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and
the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1966-67 (1987)
(arguing that progressivity is necessary if the policy goal of taxation is "to maximize individual
welfare").
294 See Graetz, supra note 50, at 273.
2" See Gutman, supra note 51, at 1191-92 (explaining "backstop" mechanism).
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component that plays an important role in that scheme even if it
lacks an independent justification.
If the primary role of the estate tax is to safeguard the
progressivity of the income tax or prevent avoidance of income tax
rules, or both, it is unclear how excluding publicity rights from the
gross estate on the basis of a state forced-share statute would serve
either of those goals. Celebrity entertainers, particularly those who
are likely to have valuable publicity rights, can earn tens or even
hundreds of millions of dollars each year.296 If the goal of estate
taxation is to make the overall tax system more progressive, then
the estates of wealthy celebrities ought to pay a higher, not lower,
tax. Moreover, if a celebrity carefully safeguards his or her publicity
right during life, the right could appreciate in value and that
appreciation will remain untaxed during the celebrity's lifetime.297
Creating a special exclusion for a celebrity's right of publicity would
seem to frustrate the goal of backstopping the income tax. In any
event, Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr do not assert that their
proposed exclusion of postmortem publicity rights from the gross
estate at death would be consistent with the policy goals underlying
the overall federal taxation scheme.
Apart from global concerns involving other elements of the tax
system, scholars have articulated more specific policy goals for the
estate tax that would be frustrated by the hypothetical statute
conceived by Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr. One of the oldest
justifications for imposing limitations on the transmission of
property at death is that doing so prevents undue concentrations of
wealth within families, and such dynastic concentrations are
detrimental to economic growth and the political process.2 98
296 See The Celebrity 100, FORBES, June 3, 2009, http//www.forbes.com (in the search bar,
search "The Celebrity 100"; click on the first article) (providing annual income estimates
for 100 celebrities).
"' See Madoff, supra note 75, at 760-61 (explaining how J.D. Salinger's postmortem
publicity rights may be worth more than those of other celebrities in light of his refusal to
exploit them inter vivos).
"9 See Repetti, supra note 52, at 825-36, 851-52 (arguing that historical and modem
criticisms of wealth concentration justify federal estate tax). For relevant historical
arguments, see, for example, THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1821), reprinted in 1 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 1, 73 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bregh eds., 1904),
who advocated the repeal of "the laws of entail" in order to "prevent the accumulation and
perpetuation of wealth, in select families"; THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 221 (Alfred A.
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Scholars have also promoted wealth transfer taxation on the ground
that, by reducing the advantages of inherited wealth, it will promote
equality of opportunity.299 Even if the estate tax is unnecessary to
support policy goals relating to the income tax, it may play an
independent role in ensuring a fair, democratic society.
These specific rationales for the estate tax counsel against the
exclusion of assets from the gross estate on the basis of a state
forced-share statute. A statute providing that certain relatives of
the decedent inherit regardless of the decedent's last wishes
obviously has the potential to limit equality of opportunity. Mark
Ascher has criticized the current scheme of voluntary testation on
the ground that "[c]hildren lucky enough to have been raised,
acculturated, and educated by wealthy parents need not be allowed
the additional good fortune of inheriting their parents' property."3
00
Under the current scheme, at least the testator has the power to
prevent this apparent windfall. A forced-heirship statute of the sort
envisioned by Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr would exacerbate the
problem by limiting even the testator's ability to interfere with the
children's good fortune. A tax designed to promote equality of
opportunity or prevent dynastic accumulation of wealth should not
encourage states to adopt forced-heirship statutes.
Knopf 1994) (1791-1792), who proposed a progressive estate tax "to extirpate the overgrown
influence arising from the unnatural law of primogeniture"; and ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 30 (Henry Reeve trans., New York, Craighead & Allen 1838), who
noted that the abolition of primogeniture grinds "the bulwarks of the influence of wealth...
down to the fine and shifting sand which is the basis of democracy." For a modern
philosophical perspective, see, for example, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971)
(arguing that the purpose of inheritance and gift taxes "is not to raise revenue (release
resources to government) but gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth
and to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair
equality of opportunity"). Similar concerns motivated opposition to monopolistic practices
during the Progressive Era. See RICHARD HOFsTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 205-06 (1966) (considering opposition to monopoly in context of
Sherman Act).
29 See Alstott, supra note 53, at 470-71 (calling equality of opportunity a "bedrock"
principle of inheritance taxation); Ascher, supra note 53, at 73 (favoring equality of
opportunity over freedom of testation); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 207 (1980) (advocating tax regime in which "seniors may not deprive their
juniors of their prima facie right to a starting point of undominated equality").
3 Ascher, supra note 53, at 74. On the significant role played by human capital in the
modern transmission of family wealth, see John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century
Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 729-39 (1988).
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In addition to concerns about dynastic wealth and equality of
opportunity, estate taxation has been justified as a way of
compensating the state for its role as a "silent partner" in the
accumulation of the decedent's wealth.3"' According to this view,
great wealth cannot be accumulated without an economic system
that promotes (or at least tolerates) wealth creation, and that system
may reasonably expect a return on its contribution."0 2 Given that
fame derives from public enthusiasm, this argument is particularly
potent with regard to publicity rights."3 Why should society not be
entitled to share in the revenue stream produced by postmortem
publicity rights, when public acclaim is the source of that revenue?
The silence of Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr on this point
suggests an additional problem with their hypothetical statute: they
offer no basis for distinguishing postmortem publicity rights from
other property that might be the subject of a forced share. If
freedom of testation were made a prerequisite to inclusion of
property in the gross estate under § 2033, then states could preempt
federal estate taxation not only for postmortem publicity rights, but
for any assets, simply by extending the forced share to cover those
assets. To avoid this result, the federal exception would need to be
limited to postmortem publicity rights. Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr, however, do not suggest that state forced-share statutes
would have a special tax-related significance for that particular
category of property, as opposed to other illiquid assets.
Even if the exception is limited to postmortem publicity rights,
the approach of Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr could lead to
inconsistent federal estate tax results depending on the decedent's
domicile. If there is some good reason for excluding postmortem
publicity rights from the gross estate, it would seem much simpler
to exclude them outright, rather than to make the exclusion
dependent on a state's adoption of a forced share. Gans, Crawford,
301 See PENNELL, supra note 54, at 11 (discussing "silent partner" theory).
302 For an early statement of the theory, see E.J. James, The State as an Economic Factor,
in SCIENCE ECONOMIC DISCUSSION 24, 32 (New York, the Science Co. 1886). The argument,
however, might justify taxation of income rather than, or in addition to, wealth. See Eric
Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 362-66 (2000) (arguing that
wealth should not be subject to a greater tax burden solely because it is acquired through
deferred consumption).
303 See supra text accompanying notes 137-42.
2009]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
and Blattmachr do not argue that a more complex scheme would be
preferable as a policy matter.
C. VALUATION
In their original Pocket Part essay, Gans, Crawford, and
Blattmachr argue that publicity rights may pose a liquidity problem
when a celebrity's estate lacks other, more easily marketable assets
with which to pay the tax.3"4 Part of the problem is that it is difficult
to assign an objective value to publicity rights. The Service may
conclude that the rights are worth more than they actually are or
may force the devisees or heirs to sell rights that the celebrity did
not wish to be exploited in order to pay the tax. Under the Treasury
Regulations, the Service levies tax on assets of the estate at their
"fair market value," defined as "the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." °5 This definition, however,
fails to provide useful guidance in valuing particular types of assets,
especially those that are extremely personal.0 6 While publicity
rights fall into this category, they are not unique in this respect,
because many other assets that are notoriously difficult to value may
nonetheless be included in the gross estate under § 2033.307
In a 1998 article, Ray Madoff described one type of valuation
problem that may occur with respect to the taxation of postmortem
publicity rights.30 ' Suppose that a celebrity, such as novelist J.D.
Salinger, maintained a secluded existence during his lifetime and
did little to exploit his right of publicity. Suppose further that when
that celebrity dies, his family believes that it would be offensive to
the celebrity's memory to license his name or likeness for
commercial use. Under current law, the family's wishes would not
' See Gans et al., Postmortem Rights, supra note 39, at 206-07 (discussing valuation and
liquidity concerns associated with publicity rights).
305 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 2000).
'e See Madoff, supra note 75, at 761-64 (noting that "one-size-fits-all" approach of estate
tax system "can produce problematic results with respect to publicity rights").
307 5BIrKER&LOKKEN, supra note 238, 1 125.7, at 125-18 (mentioning"real estate, works
of art, options, stock of family corporations, and business goodwill" as examples).
' See generally Madoff, supra note 75.
[Vol. 44:1
IMMORTAL FAME
affect the valuation of the property for purposes of the estate tax
because a hypothetical buyer might be willing to pay a great deal to
make use of the celebrity's image. °9 This could lead to a nightmare
scenario described by Gans, Crawford, and Blattmachr in which the
celebrity's heirs are forced to exploit the postmortem rights of
publicity against their will merely to pay the tax.10 Doing so would
deprive celebrities like Salinger of their privacy.31'
In addition to the problem identified by Madoff, however, there is
also a second difficulty with valuing publicity rights. Celebrities like
John Lennon, Marilyn Monroe, and Elvis Presley, whose publicity
rights continue to produce significant revenue decades after their
passing, are likely to be atypical. Although it is not possible to say
for certain, one suspects that few consumers will be interested in
purchasing merchandise emblazoned with the name or image of
Anna Nicole Smith thirty or forty years hence. The case of James
Brown, whose estate has apparently faced financial difficulties in the
immediate aftermath of his death,312 shows that even a bona fide
entertainment icon may not be a reliable source of posthumous
revenue. Moreover, if the publicity rights are devised outright to the
surviving spouse, they will be exempt from estate tax until the
spouse's death because of the marital deduction.313 Thus, even if
heirs or devisees are willing to exploit a deceased celebrity's
publicity rights, the rights may be worth very little by the surviving
spouse's death.
Despite the likelihood that publicity rights will retain value after
death only in rare cases, the Service may claim that the publicity
rights are of great value based on the celebrity's lifetime fame.
Under current law, the taxpayer generally has the burden of proof
in valuation disputes, and the Service's determination of a deficiency
309 Id. at 760-62,780-82 ("[Uinder the basic estate tax rules, it is irrelevant whether there
is any plan to realize the market value of the asset.").
310 See Gans et al., Postmortem Rights, supra note 39, at 207 ("The estate tax inclusion of
a decedent's postmortem publicity rights could result in an estate tax liquidity problem .. ").
311 Rules preventing testators from ordering the destruction of certain property also
implicate the testator's privacy and raise similar tax concerns. See Hirsch, supra note 153,
at 76-77 & n.157 (discussing author Jacqueline Susann, who requested by will that her diary
be destroyed, only to have the Service later value it at $3.8 million).
3" See Segal, supra note 4 (discussing Brown's financial state at his death).




is presumed correct.314 In 1998, Congress amended the Code to shift
the burden to the Service in certain situations, such as where the
taxpayer introduces "credible evidence" and satisfies several
procedural requirements, or when the Service uses "statistical
information on unrelated taxpayers" to reconstruct a particular item
of taxpayer income.315 Congress enacted these provisions to "help
taxpayers" who would otherwise be "forced to settle with the IRS
because the taxpayer carries that burden of proof."316  Although
opinions differ on the degree to which the new provisions will be
helpful to taxpayers, these measures show that Congress is capable
of responding to fairness concerns relating to valuation.317
Congress could address the difficulty of valuing postmortem
publicity rights in various ways. Perhaps the simplest solution
would be for Congress to declare the value of postmortem publicity
rights to be zero for tax purposes, eliminating the valuation problem
entirely. Because the estates of at least a few deceased celebrities
produce millions of dollars in annual revenue from their publicity
rights,318 however, valuing these rights at zero would not likely be
consistent with the goals underlying the federal transfer tax
system.319 Rather than setting the valuation at zero, therefore,
Congress could exempt publicity rights from transfer taxation up to
a certain dollar amount, so that only unusually valuable rights are
taxed. Alternatively, a statute might shift the burden to the Service
to establish the value of the rights, as § 7491 of the Code currently
does for income determinations based on statistical evidence about
314 See TAX CT. R. 142(a) (placing burden of proof on petitioner unless stated otherwise);
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) ("[Commissioner's] ruling has the support of a
presumption of correctness, and the petitioner has the burden of proving it to be wrong."); 2
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
115.4.2, at S115-33 (Supp. 2009).
315 26 U.S.C. § 7491; see also 2 BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 314, 115.4.2, at S115-36
to -39 (describing specific conditions under which burden shifts to Service).
316 144 CONG. REC. H3936 (daily ed. May 22, 1998) (statement of Rep. Portman).
317 Compare Jerry A. Kasner, Why Burden-of-Proof Rules Will Affect Valuation Issues, TAX
NOTES, Oct. 12, 1998, at 239 ("[Ihe shift of the burden-of-proof rules ... will have a huge
impact on estate and gift tax valuation issues."), with Nathan E. Clukey, Examining the
Limited Benefits of the Burden of Proof Shift, TAX NOTES, Feb. 1, 1999, at 683 ("[The new
provision's most significant effect, at least initially, will be on settlement.").
8 See sources cited supra note 23.
319 See supra note 290 and accompanying text for discussion of five important goals
underlying the federal estate tax.
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other taxpayers.32 This would not address Madoffs concern
regarding families who prefer not to exploit the deceased celebrity's
image, but it might discourage the Service from making exaggerated
claims when a minor celebrity dies.82' As Madoff suggests, moreover,
Congress could deal with the former problem by allowing heirs or
devisees to set a lower value for a deceased celebrity's publicity
rights if they agree not to exploit them in excess of that value.322
Any breach of that agreement could be covered through a recapture
tax.323 Congress could also permit deferral of estate tax payments
with regard to postmortem publicity rights.324
In short, there are various ways in which Congress might amend
the Code to offer greater protection for heirs and devisees of
celebrities with regard to the taxation of postmortem publicity
rights. It is not clear, however, that this would necessarily be good
policy. Congress has provided for an unlimited deduction from the
estate tax for charitable bequests, and some type of charitable
deduction may be justifiable under any of the main policy goals
articulated for the estate tax. 25 Charitable donations benefit society
in many ways and have played a central historical role in this
country's development. 6  If the Code assigned a lower value to
publicity rights for tax purposes than their true worth, or if an
320 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
321 It is not clear, however, that shifting the burden of proof has much of an impact in
actual tax litigation. See Janene R. Finley & Allan Karnes, An Empirical Study of the Change
in the Burden of Proof in the United States Tax Court, 6 Pir. TAX REV. 61, 81 (2008)
(comparing the seven years before and after the 1998 burden-shifting statute and finding that
"individual taxpayers were not helped by the change in the burden of proof in cases before the
Tax Court").
32 Madoff, supra note 75, at 808-09.
32 See id. (explaining that heirs who later decide to exploit publicity rights would be
'subject to a recapture tax").
"" The Code currently does this for certain reversionary or remainder interests and
interests in closely held businesses. See 26 U.S.C. § 6163 (2006) (permitting postponement of
tax payments attributable to reversionary or remainder interests); id. § 6166 (allowing deferral
where estate consists largely of interest in closely held business).
325 See id. § 2055 (allowing tax deductions for all charitable bequests); Fleischer, supra
note 76, at 263-69 ([While the case for some type of charitable deduction is strong, the case
for an unlimited deduction is weak."); cf. Ray D. Madoff, Dog Eat Your Taxes?, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 9, 2008, at A23 (advocating dollar amount or percentage limit on estate-tax charitable
deduction).
... See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 76, at 1726-30 ("[Clharitable giving has been central
to the United States and its national character for centuries.").
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onerous standard of proof led the Service to undervalue publicity
rights, celebrities like James Brown and Paul Newman might have
had less of an incentive to give their publicity rights to charity.
27
Thanks to the estate tax deduction, charitable gifts of publicity
rights greatly reduce the problem of valuation and accordingly
mitigate the threat of a tax on phantom assets. In light of doubts
concerning the wisdom of recognizing postmortem publicity rights,
328
using the Code to encourage the transfer of those rights to charitable
organizations when the testator's children intend to exploit them
may be a wise strategy. In any case, it is not self-evident that
publicity rights require special tax treatment in comparison to other
assets that may be difficult to value. 9  Congress may prefer to
reassess the transfer tax system's valuation rules as a whole instead
of focusing on one isolated problem that affects only a small group
of taxpayers.33 °
V. CONCLUSION
Scholars have long debated the wisdom of respecting the wishes
of deceased persons with respect to the disposition of their property.
Because publicity rights are of relatively new vintage, it is not
frivolous to ask whether the usual preference for freedom of
testation should apply to this category of property. This Article has
accordingly considered two historical deviations from the default
rules of inheritance in the United States in order to evaluate
whether a similar departure would be justified for postmortem
127 This assumes that some celebrities would prefer to devise their publicity rights to
individuals, but opt instead for charitable devises to avoid federal estate tax. If this
assumption is correct, any reduction in the tax on noncharitable devises caused by
undervaluation could also lessen the relative incentive effect of the charitable deduction. On
the other hand, if celebrities are indifferent between charitable and noncharitable devises, or
if they prefer to devise their publicity rights to charity, undervaluing the publicity rights for
tax purposes may not interfere with the charitable incentive effect at all.
... See supra Part II.
129 See supra note 307 and accompanying text; cf Madoff, supra note 75, at 803-05 (noting
that "[c]elebrities are not the only people likely to have a valuable asset that they do not want
to treat as a marketable commodity," and that a possible future market in body parts may
raise similar concerns).
330 See Madoff, supra note 75, at 807 (advocating "a more nuanced approach to wealth" in
transfer taxation because "Itihe problem raised by personal property is a complex one and is
not likely to be solved by any quick fix").
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rights of publicity. My conclusion is that no departure is warranted.
In any event, it would be surreal to suggest that a hypothetical state
forced-share statute for publicity rights might justify the exclusion
of those rights from federal estate tax. If tied to forced heirship,
such a benefit would run counter to all the usual policy arguments
in favor of federal transfer taxation. Nothing compels the federal
government to bestow special favor on those who profit from
immortal fame.

